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 1 
The Anxiety of Influence1: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying 
Richard Briffault 
I. The Regulation of Lobbying        
A. Two Views of Lobbying 
In 1843, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court warned that “already has a class of persons 
arisen, at the seat of the general government and elsewhere, who make it a business to . . . 
procure the passage of an Act of the Legislature.”2 “The arts and misrepresentations” of these 
“designing men” raised the unsettling prospect of “mislead[ing]” members of the legislature 
“from the paths of duty.” The court acknowledged there was no evidence that anyone retained to 
persuade the state legislature had actually engaged in any misconduct, but the practice had a 
“tendency . . . in the hands of designing and corrupt men to improper tampering with members, 
and the use of extraneous, secret influence over an important branch of government.”3  The 
“designing and corrupt men” that so troubled the Pennsylvania court in Clippinger v. Hepbaugh 
were lobbyists, and the court’s concern that lobbying – that is, the use of paid agents to influence 
government action -- necessarily raises the prospect of “improper tampering” and the “use of 
extraneous, secret influence” to shape public policy remains a driving force shaping the legal 
treatment of lobbying.  
Yet, courts have also long recognized that lobbying has a legitimate place in our system 
of representative government. As New York’s highest court observed in 1893, “[i]t must be the 
right of every citizen who is interested in any proposed legislation to employ an agent, for 
compensation payable to him, to draft his bill and explain it to any committee, or the legislature, 
                                                 
1
 Apologies to Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (1973).  
2
 Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & Serg. 315, 320-21 (Pa. 1843). 
3 
Id.  
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 2 
fairly and openly, and ask to have it introduced.”4 To be sure, the New York court emphasized 
that merely drafting and explaining bills to legislators and requesting their introduction did not 
involve asking members of the legislature actually to vote for those bills, so that such activity did 
not involve the “lobby services,” which the court “condemned as against public policy.” 
According to the court, the plaintiff was “not a lobbyist” because “he had no acquaintance or 
influence with any member of the legislature, and it does not appear that he had any peculiar 
facilities for procuring legislation.”5 Today, however, we would certainly view the efforts of a 
hired agent to draft a bill, explain it to legislators, and seek the bill’s introduction as lobbying. 
The law of lobbying grows out of the tension between these two views of lobbying – 
what might be called the “good” lobbying, that is, the preparation and explanation of legislation, 
regulation, or policy proposals to advance the interests of members of the public; and the “bad” 
lobbying, such as the use of “extraneous, secret influence,” “peculiar facilities,” and “tampering” 
with legislators. In the public’s mind, the “bad” vision of lobbying clearly dominates the “good” 
one. Lobbyists like the notorious Jack Abramoff
6
 have featured prominently in scandals 
involving members of Congress, and candidates and elected officials compete to denounce 
lobbyists and to decry lobbyists’ influence on government. Lobbying has become a “very dirty 
word,”7 a virtual synonym for corruption.  Indeed, the term is so toxic that the American 
League of Lobbyists – the lobbyists’ trade association -- dropped “lobbyist” from its name and is 
                                                 
4 
Chesebrough v. Conover, 140 N.Y. 382, 387 (1893). 
5 
Id. 
6 
Jack Abramoff was a politically powerful Washington lobbyist from the mid-1990s until his activities came under 
federal scrutiny starting in 2004. As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
observed, the Department of Justice investigation into his activities “unearthed evidence of corruption so extensive 
that it ultimately implicated more than twenty public officials, staffers and lobbyists.” United States v. Ring, 706 
F.3d 460, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2013). See also United States v. Safavian, 649 F.3d 688 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (affirming 
conviction of General Services Administration chief of staff who accepted a golf trip to Scotland from Abramoff). 
7 Dan Eggen, “In midterm elections, Washington lobbying becomes a line of attack for both parties,” Washington 
Post, Oct. 6, 2010. 
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now the “Association of Government Relations Professionals.”8 But legal doctrine also reflects a 
recognition of the “good” lobbying – the right of individuals, groups, organizations, businesses, 
nonprofit associations, states and local governments,
9
 unions and other groups on their own or 
through paid representatives to seek to influence government action. Like campaign finance, 
lobbying is an essential part of modern democracy that simultaneously triggers deep-seated 
concerns about the impact of private wealth and special interests on public policy.  Again like 
campaign finance, lobbying regulation strives to hold together the differing and sometimes 
conflicting goals of protecting constitutional rights of speech, association, and petition; 
controlling undue influence and improper efforts to shape government decision-making; and 
promoting the transparency of the political process.  Indeed, lobbying and campaign finance 
regulation are increasingly linked, as reformers, lawmakers, and academics have begun to give 
greater attention to the lobbying-campaign finance nexus. 
Lobbying is a big business. At the federal level, lobbyists reported spending 
approximately $3.5 billion a year during the 2009-12 period.
10
 There is also extensive lobbying 
at the state and local level. Lobbying expenditures with respect to the New York state 
                                                 
8
 See Megan R, Wilson, “K Street group strikes ‘lobbyist’ from name,” The Hill, Nov. 18, 2013, 
http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-a-lobbying/190639-k-street-group-strikes-lobbyist-from-name.  
9
 See, e.g., Andrew Doughman, “Local governments spend $3 million to lobby Legislature – for tax increases,” Las 
Vegas Sun, July 24, 2013, 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2013/jul/24/local-governments-spend-3-million-lobby-legislatur/; “Local 
governments lobby Minnesota Legislature with $7.8 million in 2012,” Sctimes.com, July 17, 2013, 
http://www.sctimes.com/viewart/20130717/NEWS01/307170049/Local-governments-lobby-Minnesota-Legislature-
7-8-million-2012; Brian M. Rosenthal, “Local governments spend big to lobby Legislature,” The Seattle Times, 
June 18, 2013 (government entities – cities, counties, ports, Native American tribes, public utility districts and 
school districts – were the biggest category of lobbying spenders in Washington state), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2021218481_governmentlobbyingxml.html.  
10
 See OpenSecrets.org, “Lobbying Database,” http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby. Total reported federal lobbying 
spending was $3.50 billion in 2009, $3.55 billion in 2010, $3.33 billion in 2011, and $3.30 billion. Id. 
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government, for example, are running at more than $200 million per year.
11 
These numbers 
almost certainly understate actual lobbying expenditures. At the federal level, a significant 
fraction – perhaps as much as half -- of “people currently employed as policy advocates” in 
Washington do not register as lobbyists
12
 but instead, like former House Speaker Newt 
Gingrich, claim only to be giving “historical advice,”13 or, more commonly, like former Senate 
Majority Leader Tom Daschle, claim to be “strategic advisers” who shape lobbying strategy 
behind the scenes but do not engage in the direct contact with policymakers that triggers the 
statutory definition of lobbying.
14
 Moreover, at least at the federal level, even registered 
lobbyists do not have to report media expenditures or social media activities intended to 
influence the broader political and policy environment, even though such “campaign-style 
advocacy” is central to contemporary lobbying.15 
Lobbying is a heavily regulated activity, with both the extent and pace of regulation 
increasing. Congress,
16
 all fifty states,
17
 and many local governments
18
 have enacted laws 
                                                 
11
 See New York State Joint Commission on Public Ethics, 2012 Annual Report (2013) at 33 (reported lobbying 
spending was $213 million in 2010, $220 million in 2011, and $205 million in 2012). Lobbying expenses with 
respect to the New Jersey government were a record $65.6 million in 2010, up from $57.6 million in 2009, see 
Lobbying Up, Philadelphia Inquirer, March 9, 2011, 
http://www.philly.com/philly/multimedia/Lobbying_in_New_Jersey.html?view=graphic. 
12 
See Timothy M. LaPira and Herschel F. Thomas III, “Just How Many Newt Gingrich’s Are There on K Street? 
Estimating the True Size and Shape of Washington’s Revolving Door,” April 2, 2013, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2241671.  
13
 During one of the debates during the 2011-12 contest for the Republican presidential nomination, former Speaker 
Gingrich responded to the request that he explain what he had done to earn a payment of $300,000 from mortgage 
giant Freddie Mac by stating that he had not lobbied but had offered “historical advice” relevant to the mortgage 
crisis. See, e.g., Politico, Republican Debate: 7 Attacks on Newt Gingrich to Watch, Dec. 15, 
2011.http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1211/70230_Page2.html.  
14
 See, e.g., Chris Frates, “Lobbyists call bluff on ‘Daschle exemption,” Politico, July 26, 2010; Kate Ackley, 
“Lobbying Without a Trace,” Roll Call, March 20, 2013. See also Thomas Edsall, “The Shadow Lobbyist,” N.Y. 
Times, April 25, 2013, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/the-shadow-lobbyist/?_r=0. 
15
 See, e.g., Gary Andres, “Campaign-Style Advocacy: A Broader View of Lobbying,” 11 The Forum 3 (2013); 
accord, Thomas B. Edsall, “The Unlobbyists,” N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/01/opinion/edsall-the-unlobbyists.html?_r=0. 
16 
See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq (disclosure of lobbying activities). 
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regulating lobbying. Many of these measures have recently been revised and updated, and new 
proposals for lobbying regulation, as part of government ethics or political reform packages, are 
frequently advanced in Congress and many state and local legislatures.
19
 Lobbying is also 
directly affected by such other measures as the Internal Revenue Code, the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act (FARA),
20
 procurement laws, executive orders and internal legislative rules. 
This article examines the legal framework for the regulation of lobbying. The remainder 
of this Part lays out the values shaping lobbying regulation and the regulatory techniques that 
follow from those values. Part II considers how courts, particularly the United States Supreme 
Court, have treated lobbying. Parts III through V then address the principal issues that are 
attracting the attention of legislators, are contested in litigation, or are on various reform 
agendas, including the campaign finance activities of lobbyists; lobbying by former government 
officials (the “revolving door” problem); and the scope and contents of lobbyist disclosure 
requirements. Part VI briefly concludes. 
B. Values Driving Lobbying Regulation 
The regulation of lobbying has been shaped by four principal concerns:  
                                                                                                                                                             
17
 See, e.g., National Conference of State Legislatures (hereinafter “NCSL”), “Lobbyist Activity Report 
Requirements,” (updated January 2013) 
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/ethicshome/50-state-chart-lobbyist-report-requirements.aspx.  
18 
See, e.g., N.Y.C. Admin Code, §§ 3-211 et seq, http://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/html/lobbying/law_admin.shtml; 
City of Chicago, Governmental Ethics Ordinance, §§2-156-210 et seq,, Municipal Code of Chicago, 
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/ethics/general/Ordinances/GEO-Jan-2013.pdf; Municipal 
Lobbying Ordinance, Los Angeles Municipal Code, §§ 48.01 et seq, http://ethics.lacity.org/PDF/laws/law_mlo.pdf.   
19 
For only a handful of recent examples, see Nicholas Kuznets, “IMPACT: Georgia governor signs bills limiting 
gifts from lobbyists,” Center for Public Integrity, May 7, 2013, 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/05/07/12622/impact-georgia-governor-signs-bills-limiting-gifts-lobbyists; 
Nathan Shaker, “Mayor signs revision to Philadelphia Lobbying Law,” Lobby Comply Blog, Nov.1, 2011, 
http://67.39.100.124/wordpress/?p=6291; Cy Ryan, Bill on Lobbyist Spending on Legislators Introduced, Las Vegas 
Sun, Mar. 1, 2011; Chris Joyner, Commission Expands Definition of Lobbyist, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Mar. 7, 
2011;  Sarita Chourey, SC Lobbyists Face Tighter Restrictions, The Augusta Chronicle, Mar. 31, 2011; Beveridge 
& Diamond, “Expansion of the Massachusetts’ Lobbying Law May Catch Many Unaware,” 2010, 
http://www.bdlaw.com/news-797.html.  
20 
22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq. 
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(1) protection of the opportunity for individuals, groups, and organizations to lobby, that 
is, to present facts, arguments, and views to legislative and executive branch officials; 
(2) prevention of improper influence on government action; 
(3) promotion of a level playing field by restricting unfair or unequal opportunities to 
influence government action; and 
(4) provision for the transparency of lobbyist-government official interactions. 
The first concern is aimed at preventing regulations that would interfere with the ability 
of people to lobby or use lobbyists to inform and influence government action. Lobbying is an 
aspect of the freedoms of speech, press, association, and petition protected by the constitution. 
Lobbying can advise government officials about conditions in particular industries, geographic 
areas, government subunits, or socio-economic groups; the costs and benefits of proposed laws 
and regulations; the consequences of government actions under consideration; and the views of 
those affected by potential government decisions. It is a means of political expression, a form of 
popular participation in government, and a tool for educating government decision-making. 
But if the first value of lobbying regulation is to assure that the core right to communicate 
with government is not abridged, the second goal reflects the concern that lobbying can be, and 
often has been, accompanied by inappropriate techniques inconsistent with public-regarding 
decision-making. Lobbying should inform and thereby improve government action, not distort it 
by appeals to the private self-interest of decision-makers. The principal concern here is not with 
the communicative aspect of lobbying per se, but with activities ancillary to communication that 
may improperly influence government action. To be sure there is no widely agreed-upon 
definition of the proper influences on government action – such as whether and to what extent an 
elected official should consider the needs or preferences of her local constituency versus the state 
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or nation as a whole; the implications of a vote or decision for her reelection; or the views of the 
leaders of her political party or her supporters in the last election. But it is generally recognized 
that it is improper for a public official to take an official action in exchange for, in response to, or 
in order to obtain a private or personal material benefit. The widespread criminal prohibitions of 
bribery and illegal gratuities reflect the belief that it is improper to provide officials with material 
benefits in exchange for, in response to, or to influence their official actions. As  criminal laws, 
they are focused on situations in which the private benefit is closely linked a specific official act, 
But the concern about improper private influence on government goes beyond relatively clear cut 
quid pro quos. Improper influence may occur when private benefits – such as free meals, 
entertainment, travel, or investment opportunities – are not linked to specific official acts but are 
intended merely to facilitate access, provide opportunities for quasi-social interaction, smooth 
relations, or promote good will towards the lobbyists and the interests they represent. Even 
though not tied to specific official actions, such benefits can still distract government 
decision-makers from the public interest or skew the formation of public policy. As a result, they 
constitute a form of improper influence that may be subject to regulation.  
A third goal is preventing some lobbyists from obtaining unfair or unequal influence 
relative to others. The concerns about improper and unfair influence overlap. If one lobbyist 
provides an official with a material benefit and others do not, this may constitute both improper 
and unfair influence. But the concern about unfair influence focuses in particular on lobbyists 
who, based on their past or present relationships with government officials, may have 
opportunities for special access to officials that are not available to other people attempting to 
communicate with these officials. This has been an impetus for the rules intended to limit the 
ability of former government officials to lobby agencies or branches of government where they 
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recently worked, that is, so-called “cooling off” or “revolving door” restrictions.21 The concern 
about unequal influence can also be seen underlying the laws governing the tax treatment of 
lobbying. Under the Internal Revenue Code, businesses may not treat lobbying expenditures as 
deductible ordinary and necessary business expenses,
22
 while a charitable organization entitled 
to receive tax-deductible contributions under section 501(c)(3) will forfeit that favorable tax 
treatment if “attempting, to influence legislation” constitutes a “substantial part” of its 
activities.
23
 Both of these tax provisions reflect the view that deductibility is a form of 
government subsidy inconsistent with a level playing field for lobbying. Similarly, the Byrd 
Amendment,
24
 which bars the use of funds appropriated by Congress to lobby for federal 
contracts, grants, loans, and cooperative agreements, reflects Congress’s concern not to subsidize 
some lobbying activity. To be sure, the impact of the value of preventing unequal influence is 
quite limited. Lobbying involves the expenditure of private funds, and different individuals, 
firms, groups, and organizations have widely different amounts of resources available to them. 
They are, thus, capable of spending widely different amounts on lobbying. In theory, 
equalization could be advanced by capping the spending of those with great resources or 
subsidizing the lobbying of those without resources. However, limits on lobbying expenditures, 
like limits on campaign expenditures, would run straight into the First Amendment. There is no 
constitutional objection to offering subsidies for lobbying, but with thousands upon thousands of 
                                                 
21 
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 207. For federal revolving door restrictions, see generally Jack Maskell, 
“Post-Employment, ‘Revolving Door,’ Laws for Federal Personnel,” Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress, 7-5700 (Sept. 13, 2012). 
22
 Section 162(e) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 
provides that expenses incurred in attempting to influence federal or state legislation, administrative action or 
referenda may not be deducted as business expenses.  
23 
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). 
24
 13 U.S.C. § 1352. 
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bills, amendments, appropriations, regulations and other measures subject to lobbying each year, 
it is difficult to see how lobbying with respect to any specific measure or issue area could be 
equalized, although it would certainly be possible to provide subsidies or tax breaks to 
organizations that lobby on behalf of politically weak or underrepresented groups. Instead of 
addressing lobbying inequality generally, the level-playing-field goal tends to focus more 
narrowly on inequalities that flow from government action, such as the provision of government 
funds and tax benefits to some but not other lobbyists, or the benefits some lobbyists may obtain 
from prior government service. 
(4) The goal of transparency is central to contemporary lobbying regulation. Indeed, with 
the proliferation of open meetings laws, freedom of information laws, public access to records 
laws, public official financial disclosure laws and other “government in the sunshine” measures, 
transparency has become a central focus of the regulation of government operations. 
Transparency can promote public understanding of how government works, enable the people to 
better assess government performance, seek change, and hold government accountable for its 
actions. Measures promoting transparency do not of their own force actually prohibit any 
lobbying or activities ancillary to lobbying, but they may discourage practices that are, or are 
likely to be perceived as, improper or unfair. As Justice Brandeis famously observed nearly a 
century ago, “[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. 
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”25 
It is sometimes asserted that transparency promotes public confidence in government. It 
is not clear if this is really the case. Greater public attention to the nitty-gritty of government 
operations, to the battling of party and group interests, the pulling and hauling and the wheeling 
                                                 
25 
 Brandeis, “What Publicity Can Do,” Harper’s Weekly, Dec. 20, 1913, at 10. 
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and dealing inherent in legislative decision-making could be demoralizing rather than 
confidence-building. The dictum often (perhaps mistakenly) attributed to Bismarck that “laws, 
like sausages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as we know how they are made”26 may be 
more accurate. Nevertheless, the public is surely likely to be anxious when interactions between 
lawmakers and lobbyists are hidden behind closed doors. As a result, transparency may be 
valuable in ameliorating public suspicions about lobbyist-government misconduct even if it does 
not produce confidence in the results of the disclosed interactions. Certainly, transparency 
facilitates public oversight and pressure for the adoption of reforms to address forms of improper 
or unfair influence that transparency may reveal. 
C. Techniques of Lobbying Regulation 
Lobbying regulatory techniques follow from the values driving regulation. Commitment 
to the petitioning, associational, and communicative activity at the core of lobbying means that 
lobbying per se – that is, the fact and substantive content of the advocacy of legislation, 
administrative action, or policy proposals – cannot be prohibited or limited in amount. As a 
result, one technique is, in a sense, no-regulation. Unlike, say, in campaign finance, where 
federal and many state laws restrict contributions to candidates or political parties, there is no 
restriction on the use of private funds to hire lobbyists and pay for lobbying expenditures. 
Indeed, even regulatory fees imposed on lobbyists as part of registration and reporting 
requirements have been subject to constitutional oversight; when found to be greater than 
necessary to cover the costs of enforcing those requirements, fees may be struck down as an 
                                                 
26
 According to Professor Fred Shapiro the quip so frequently associated with Bismarck was really first uttered by 
“lawyer-poet John Godfrey Saxe” in 1869, and was not generally attributed to Bismarck until the 1930s. see Fred R. 
Shapiro, Quote . . . Misquote, N.Y. Times, July 21, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/21/magazine/27wwwl-guestsafire-t.html?_r=0. 
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unconstitutional tax on lobbying.
27
 
Although lobbying per se is constitutionally protected, some of the ancillary activities of 
lobbyists, such as the provision of private benefits to public officials, can be restricted. Gifts, free 
meals and entertainment, honoraria, and other private benefits to government officials may be 
barred outright, subject to dollar limitations, restricted under some circumstances, or required to 
be reported.
28
 Recently, concern about improper influence has begun to focus on the role of 
lobbyists in financing election campaigns. Although campaign contributions and fundraising do 
not provide elected officials with personal pecuniary benefits, as the funds so provided must be 
used for electioneering activity, they can certainly be at least as effective in garnering the 
attention and gratitude of officials who have to stand for reelection or want to seek higher office 
as free dinners or complementary Super Bowl tickets. In addition, to reduce any temptation 
lobbyists may feel to engage in improper activity, many jurisdictions regulate contingent fees, 
primarily through prohibition but also through disclosure requirements.  
The principal regulatory technique for addressing unfair or unequal influence is the 
cooling-off period or revolving door law. These rules vary considerably with respect to the 
determination of who ought to be regulated and the length and scope of the cooling-off 
requirement, but the central idea is that for some period of time a former government employee 
should be barred from lobbying the office where she used to work in order to prevent her from 
taking advantage of the inside information and personal contacts she acquired at that office. At 
                                                 
27 
See, e.g., Moffett v. Killian, 360 F. Supp. 228 (D. Conn. 1973); Fidanque v. Oregon Standards and Practices 
Comm., 969 P.2d 376 (Ore. 1998); ACLU of Illinois v. White, 692 F. Supp.2d 896 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
28
 See, e.g., Chip Nielsen, Jason D. Kaune, and Jennie Unger Skelton, “State Lobby and Gift Laws,” Practising Law 
Institute, 2010, 1837 PLI/Corp 597; National Conference of State Legislatures, “Ethics: Legislator Gift Restrictions 
Overview,” Updated March 2013, 
ttp://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/ethicshome/50-state-table-gift-laws.aspx. 
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the national level, the Obama Administration adopted a number of regulatory measures, 
reflecting both the anti-improper influence and level playing field goals of barring lobbyists from 
certain government positions – a “reverse revolving door” rule. Again, the underlying concern 
appears to be that the official will be affected by personal connections to the lobbyists with 
whom she used to work or the clients she used to represent, or by a psychological predisposition 
to be sympathetic to the positions advocated by former colleagues or clients. This might give 
them an unfair advantage over other firms or interest groups with a stake in the official’s 
government decisions.   
The value of transparency is widely advanced by federal, state and local lobbying 
disclosure laws. Lobbyists are required to register with a designated regulator and then file 
periodic reports concerning their activities. The reports tend to focus on the money trail, that is, 
the funds paid by clients or principals to lobbyists, and the funds spent by lobbyists in the course 
of their representational activities. Recent regulatory measures and proposed reforms have 
sought to widen the scope of these reports to include, inter alia:  the disclosure of so-called 
indirect spending intended to advance the lobbying agenda by persuading members of the public 
to contact government decision-makers; greater disclosure of the groups that fund the 
organization that is a lobbyist’s nominal client; and more information concerning the particular 
officials contacted by lobbyists and the matters discussed with them.  
 
II. Lobbying and the Constitution 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of lobbying originally focused on the problem of lobbyist 
contingency fees. In those series -- running from the mid-nineteenth through the early twentieth 
centuries -- the Court demonstrated a very low regard for lobbying. In the 1950s, however, the 
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Court shifted focus and determined that lobbying is protected by the First Amendment. However, 
even after reframing lobbying as a constitutionally protected activity, the Court has been willing 
to uphold some regulation of lobbying, particularly disclosure.  
A. In the Beginning: The Courts and Lobbying in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries 
In November 1847, Alexander Marshall, an experienced “lobby member” before the 
Virginia legislature, wrote to the officials of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad proposing that they 
retain him to help persuade the legislature to grant the railroad a certain right of way it wanted. 
Marshall’s proposal stressed the need for “an active, interested, well-organized influence” in the 
legislature. Marshall urged that the railroad  
inspire your agents with an earnest, nay, an anxious wish for success. You must give 
them nothing if they fail, endow them richly if they succeed . . . . My plan would aim to 
place the “right-of-way” members on an equality with their adversaries [a competing 
railroad], by sending down a corps of agents, stimulated by an active partisanship by the 
strong lure of profit . . . Under this plan you pay nothing unless a law be passed which 
your company will accept . . . . I have surveyed the difficulties of this undertaking, and 
think they may be surmounted. The cash outlay for my own expenses, and those of the 
subagents, would be heavy. I know the effective service of such agents as I would 
employ cannot be had except on a heavy contingent. I should not like to undertake the 
business on such terms, unless provided with a contingent fund of at least $50,000 [or 
about $1.2 million in 2013 dollars], secured to my order on the passage of a law, and its 
acceptance by your company.
29
 
 
Marshall’s proposal stressed that he “contemplate[d] the use of no improper means or appliances 
in the attainment of your purpose. My scheme is to surround the legislature with respectable and 
influential agents, whose persuasive arguments may influence the members to do you a naked act 
of justice.”30 Marshall did, however, emphasize the need to keep the arrangement secret “from 
motives of policy alone, because an open agency would furnish ground of suspicion and 
                                                 
29
 Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio RR Co., 57 U.S. 314, 317-19 (1854). 
30
 Id. at 318. 
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unmerited invective, and might weaken the impression we seek to make.”31 Subsequently, 
Marshall, claiming both that the arrangement had been agreed to by the railroad and that he had 
won the railroad what it wanted from the Virginia legislature, sued the railroad over its failure to 
pay his fee.  
The dispute ultimately came before the United States Supreme Court, which dismissed 
Marshall’s claim, finding the contract void for public policy. Although the Court determined that 
“[a]ll persons whose interests may in any way be affected by any public or private act of the 
legislature, have an undoubted right to urge their claims and arguments, either in person or by 
counsel professing to act for them, before legislative committees,”32 Marshall’s concealment of 
his role as the railroad’s agent was troubling: “A hired advocate or agent, assuming to act in a 
different character, is practicing deceit on the legislature.”33 And the Court expressed concern 
that the contingency arrangement would inevitably lead to improper influence and outright 
corruption: 
“Bribes in the shape of high contingent compensation, must necessarily lead to the use of 
improper means and the exercise of undue influence. Their necessary consequence is the 
demoralization of the agent who covenants for them; he is soon brought to believe that 
any means which will produce so beneficial a result to himself are proper means; and that 
a share of these profits may have the same effect of quickening the perceptions and 
warming the zeal of influential or careless’ members in favor of his bill. The use of such 
means and agents will have the effect to subject the State governments to the combined 
capital of wealthy corporations, and produce universal corruption, commencing with the 
representative and ending with the elector.”34 
 
The Court concluded that “contracts for a contingent compensation for obtaining legislation, or 
to use any personal or any secret influence or any secret or sinister influence on legislators, is 
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 Id. at 335. 
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void by policy of the law.”35 
Marshall foreshadowed some of the principal themes of lobbying regulation today: 
recognition of the right to present “claims and arguments” to the legislature and to hire 
representatives to assist in doing so; hostility to secrecy and a preference for the transparency of 
lobbying arrangements; and anxiety that lobbyists will employ improper means or exercise 
undue influence in pursuit of their goals. Marshall focused on the potential for improper 
influence inherent in secrecy and the use of contingency fees, but in other cases the Court treated 
lobbying per se as troublesome. A decade after Marshall, the Supreme Court decided Providence 
Tool Company v. Norris,
36
 which involved a contingent fee agreement pursuant to which a 
lobbyist had secured Providence Tool a contract to provide muskets to the Union Army at the 
outset of the Civil War. Justice Field declared that “all agreements for pecuniary considerations 
to control the business operations of the Government, or the regular administration of justice, or 
the appointments to public offices, or the ordinary course of legislation, are void as against 
public policy, without reference to the question, whether improper means are contemplated or 
used in their execution.”37 Inherent in lobbying is the “tendency . . . to introduce personal 
solicitation and personal influence, as elements in the procurement of contracts; and thus directly 
lead to inefficiency in the public service, and to unnecessary expenditures of the public funds.”38 
Lobbying contracts were invalid “whether [or not] improper influences were contemplated or 
used, but upon the corrupting tendency of the agreements,” and contingency agreements were 
particularly problematic because of the incentive to “the use of sinister and corrupt means for the 
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accomplishment of the end desired.”39 
In Trist v. Child,
40
 decided a decade after Provident Tool, the Court clarified that some 
contracts for “purely professional services” in presenting legislation to Congress would be valid 
and enforceable.  
“[D]rafting the petition to set forth the claim, attending to the taking of testimony, 
collecting facts, preparing arguments, and submitting them orally or in writing to a 
committee or other proper authority.Butsuch services are separated by a broad line of 
demarcation from personal solicitation.
 41
  
 
The Court provided as an example of objectionable activity a letter from the lobbyist to his client 
urging him:  
“Please write to your friends to write to any member of Congress. Every vote tells, and a 
simple request may secure a vote, he not caring anything about it. Set every man you 
know to work. Even if he knows a page, for a page often gets a vote.” 
 
The Court strongly condemned such paid personal-solicitation lobbying:  
“The agreement in the present case was for the sale of the influence and exertions of the 
lobby agent to bring about the passage of a law for the payment of a private claim, 
without reference to its merits, by means which, if not corrupt, were illegitimate, and 
considered in connection with the pecuniary interest of the agent at stake, contrary to the 
plainest principles of public policy.”42 
 
To be sure, the contingent compensation aggravated the abuse. “[W]here the avarice of the agent 
is inflamed by the hope of a reward contingent upon success, and to be graduated by a 
percentage upon the amount appropriated, the danger of tampering in its worst form is greatly 
increased.”43 But the reliance on “personal solicitation” to influence legislative action was itself 
a problem. 
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 At the start of the twentieth century, the Court remained hostile to the payment of 
compensation for lobbying. In Hazelton v. Sheckels,
44
 Justice Holmes determined that where 
part of the consideration for a contract consisted of “services in procuring legislation upon a 
matter of public interest” the contract could not be enforced.45 Similarly, in Earle v. Myers46 in 
1907, the Court noted that “services . . . of the kind known as lobbying services” involving the 
use of “personal influence and personal solicitation with members of Congress” were “illicit” 
and claims for compensation for such services were unenforceable.
47
 On the other hand, in the 
1927 decision in Steele v. Drummond,
48 
the Court found that a contract which required, in part, 
that the plaintiff seek the enactment of local ordinances approving the construction of a proposed 
railroad line in a particular location, was valid in the absence of a showing that the contract 
“require[ed] or contemplate[ed] . . . action as a matter of favor by means of personal influence, 
solicitation and the like, or by other improper or corrupt means.” Without evidence “that tends to 
indicate that in the promotion or passage of [the ordinances] there was any departure from the 
best standards of duty to the public,” the plaintiff’s claim would be enforced.49  
These Supreme Court decisions are representative of a number of federal and state cases 
from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that grappled with lobbying. Most dealt with the 
propriety of paying for lobbyists’ services, whether under a contingent fee agreement or in suits 
against corporate boards of directors or public bodies for authorizing the hiring of lobbyists.
50
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Some of the early cases were particularly hostile to paid lobbyists. A New York court damned 
the “swarms of hired retainers of the claimants upon public bounty or justice” as a threat to “free, 
honorable, and correct” legislative deliberation,51 and a Tennessee court asserted that “[t]he 
practice of lobbying is in its very nature demoralizing and corrupting.”52 Others recognized that 
“the use of money to influence legislation is not always wrong. It depends upon the manner of its 
use.”53 As the Kansas Supreme Court explained in 1871: 
“If it be used to pay for the publication of circulars or pamphlets, or otherwise, or the 
collection or distribution of information openly and publicly among the members of the 
legislature, there is nothing objectionable or improper. But if it be used directly in bribing, or 
indirectly in working up a personal influence upon individual members, conciliating them by 
suppers, presents, or any of the machinery so well known to lobbyists, which aims to secure a 
member’s vote without reference to his judgment, then it is not only illegal but one of the 
grossest infractions of social duty of which an individual can, under the circumstances of the 
present day, be guilty. . . . For it is the way of death to republican institutions.”54 
 
Perhaps the most striking feature of these early cases, particularly those that struggled to 
distinguish between proper and improper means of seeking legislative action is their view that 
“personal influence,” “importunities to members of the legislature,” “seducing or influencing 
them by any other arguments, persuasions, or inducements than such as directly and legitimately 
bear upon the merits of the pending application”55 were improper actions akin to bribery and 
corruption. Personal influence was often linked to lack of transparency, with courts referring to 
“dishonest, secret, or unfair means;” 56  “secret and insidious overtures,”57  or “the use of 
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personal, or any secret or sinister, influence upon legislators.”58 But even in the absence of a 
showing of bribery, secrecy, “hang[ing] around legislators for the purpose of influencing such 
legislators whereby legislative action is to be procured,”59 and the personal solicitation of 
legislative votes were tantamount to corruption. Influence disconnected from substantive 
information or public-regarding arguments about the merits of a measure – even without bribery 
or criminal misconduct – tended to corrupt the legislative process. By contrast, more public 
efforts – testimony in public hearings before legislative committees,60 “the collecting of facts, 
and presenting them to the proper officers, making arguments thereon”61 -- and the use of 
“special knowledge and training” derived from “years of study and experience” concerning the 
issue in dispute -- were legitimate means of seeking legislative action.
62
  
Although lobbying in this period was often treated as a shady, indeed, illicit activity – the 
California constitution actually made lobbying a felony
63
 – legal condemnation did not extend to 
all paid efforts to influence the legislature, but only those involving “bribery, promise of reward, 
intimidation, or any other dishonest means.”64 The difference between this period and our own 
was the widespread determination that lobbyists’ use of personal influence, including personal 
solicitation of legislative votes, fell on the corruption side of the corruption/legitimate advocacy 
divide. The particular problem with the contingency fee agreements that triggered much of this 
litigation was that they were seen as providing an incentive to the use of improper means of 
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seeking legislative action, even when the actual use of improper means had not been proven.
65 
But the deeper point was the courts’ tendency to conclude that legislative advocacy involving 
private meetings, personal solicitations, and the use of personal influence – a term never 
precisely defined, but used as a contrast to influence based on facts, “fair argument and 
legitimate evidence”66 relating to the merits of a legislative proposal – went beyond the scope of 
legitimate representation. 
Although some courts in this period noted the value of appropriate advocacy in obtaining 
laws that could advance the public interest,
67
 there was little discussion of constitutional law 
and, in particular, no reference to the First Amendment. These were all common law contracts 
cases, although often inflected by concerns about the needs of our republican form of 
government.
68
 After World War II, however, issues involving the regulation of lobbying were 
constitutionalized as the Supreme Court determined that lobbying involved First Amendment 
rights. That development is the focus of the next section.  
B. Lobbying and the First Amendment 
In the 1950s, the Supreme Court reframed its analysis of lobbying from a focus on the 
potential for improper influence latent in lobbyists’ efforts at personal persuasion of legislators to 
the First Amendment’s protection of the communication about political and policy matters which 
lies at the core of lobbying. The Court’s new approach, however, recognized that even though 
protected by the First Amendment, lobbying may be regulated to protect the integrity of the 
legislative process. 
                                                 
65
 See, e.g., Note, Contingent Fee Contract to Procure Legislation, 45 Yale L.J. 731, 733 (1936). 
66
 Houlton v. Dunn, 61 N.W. 898, 901 (Minn. 1895). 
67
 See, e.g., id. at 900 (noting that “frequently our educational, charitable, and humane laws are thus procured”). 
68
 See, e.g., id. at 901 (noting that the “present iniquitous system of lobbying with members of our legislative 
bodies and public officials is fast becoming a menace to our capacity for self-government”). 
 
 21 
In United States v. Rumely,
69
 the Court considered the scope of the investigative 
authority of the House of Representatives’ Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, which had 
been created by the House in 1949 to examine how well the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act 
of 1946 (“FRLA”) was working. The Committee was authorized inter alia to “conduct a study 
and investigation of . . . all lobbying activities intended to influence, encourage, promote or 
retard legislation.” As part of its investigation it sought to obtain from Rumely, the secretary of 
an organization known as the Committee for Constitutional Government, records concerning the 
organization’s sale “of books of a particular political tendentiousness,” particularly the names of 
those who had made bulk purchases of those books for subsequent distribution. When Rumely 
refused to provide the information, the House sought to hold him in contempt.  
Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter expressed the concern that permitting the 
Committee to inquire into “all efforts of private individuals to influence public opinion through 
books and periodicals, however remote the radiations of influence which they may exert upon 
the legislative process, raises doubts of constitutionality in view of the prohibition of the First 
Amendment.”70 But the Court stopped short of holding the investigation unconstitutional. 
Instead, Justice Frankfurter noted that Congress had not defined “lobbying activities” in the 
resolution authorizing the investigation. He concluded that in order to ”avoid a serious 
constitutional doubt” about whether Congress could investigate the sale of political books to the 
public the phrase “lobbying activities”” would be read to mean “lobbying in its commonly 
accepted sense, that is representations made directly to Congress, its members, or its 
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committees.”71 Using this narrower definition of lobbying, Justice Frankfurter determined that 
Congress had not granted the Committee the authority to investigate Rumely’s organization’s 
activities.
72
 
The Court returned to the meaning of “lobbying activities,” the scope of Congressional 
authority to regulate lobbying, and the role of the First Amendment the following year in United 
States v. Harriss,
73
 which involved a prosecution brought against the National Farm Committee 
and several individuals for violations of the reporting requirements of the FRLA. Specifically, 
the Committee was charged with failing to report the solicitation and receipt of contributions to 
influence the passage of legislation, and the individuals were charged with failing to report 
expenditures for the same purpose. The expenditures included “payment of compensation to 
others to communicate face-to-face with members of Congress, at public functions and 
committee hearings concerning legislation” and payments “related to the costs of a campaign to 
induce various interested groups and individuals to communicate by letter with members of 
Congress on such legislation.” The defendants contended the statute violated the First 
Amendment and that its “vague and indefinite” language violated the Due Process Clause. The 
Court rejected both arguments. 
Relying on Rumely, the Court interpreted the FRLA to apply only to “‘lobbying in its 
commonly accepted sense’ -- to direct communication with members of Congress on pending or 
proposed federal legislation. The legislative history of the Act makes clear that, at the very least, 
Congress sought disclosure of such direct pressures, exerted by the lobbyists themselves or 
                                                 
71 
Id. at 47. 
72 
Id. at 44-49. Justices Black and Douglas concurred in the result but would have held that the investigative 
resolution was unconstitutional. 
73
 347 U.S. 612 (1954). 
 
 23 
through their hirelings or through an artificially stimulated letter campaign.”74 As such it 
satisfied the due process requirement of definiteness without violating the freedoms guaranteed 
by the First Amendment - freedom to speak, publish, and petition the Government. Chief Justice 
Warren explained that the measure was justified by Congress’s legitimate interest in knowing 
who is behind efforts to influence legislative action: 
“Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual members of Congress 
cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to which they are regularly subjected. 
Yet full realization of the American ideal of government by elected representatives 
depends to no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such pressures. Otherwise 
the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned out by the voice of special interest 
groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as proponents of the public weal. . 
. .Toward that end, Congress has not sought to prohibit these pressures. It has merely 
provided for a modicum of information from those who for hire attempt to influence 
legislation or who collect or spend funds for that purpose. It wants only to know who is 
being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much. . . .Under these circumstances, 
we believe that Congress, at least within the bounds of the Act as we have construed it, is 
not constitutionally forbidden to require the disclosure of lobbying activities. To do so 
would be to deny Congress in large measure the power of self-protection. And here 
Congress has used that power in a manner restricted to its appropriate end.”75 
 
Harriss is significant in three respects. First, without expressly saying so, the Court 
clearly indicated that lobbying is protected by the First Amendment. Although the Court 
acknowledged that lobbying involves placing pressures on members of Congress -- which greatly 
troubled the Court in the older contingency fee cases -- Harriss emphasized in upholding the 
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FRLA that “Congress has not sought to prohibit these pressures.”76 The limited scope of 
Congress’s regulation was critical to the statute’s constitutionality.  
In later cases, the Court confirmed the First Amendment’s protection of lobbying. In 
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
77
 for example, the Court 
held that the contention that a group of businesses conspired to seek passage of legislation 
beneficial to them and harmful to their competitors did not state a claim of an antitrust violation: 
“[S]uch a construction of the Sherman Act would raise important constitutional questions. The 
right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, 
lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.”78  
Second, the Court upheld disclosure because of Congress’s interest in understanding who 
is behind efforts to influence it. This carried forward Marshall’s view more than a century earlier 
that a lobbyist’s failure to disclose the principal on whose behalf he acts is a form of deceit. 
Strikingly, given our current sense that the purpose of disclosure is to educate the public, inform 
the voters, and, thus, ultimately, advance the goal of government accountability to the people, 
Harriss, like Marshall, stressed the importance of lobbying disclosure to those who are lobbied – 
in this case, members of Congress – to enable them to better understand the forces behind the 
lobbyists seeking to influence them. The Court also analogized lobbyist disclosure to the Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act, an early federal campaign finance law, which had imposed contribution 
and expenditure reporting requirements on elected officials. In adopting the FRLA, Congress 
“acted in the same spirit and for a similar purpose as it did in passing the Federal Corrupt 
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Practices Act -- to maintain the integrity of a basic governmental process.
79
 The Court’s support 
for disclosure of the identities of those behind lobbying activities was confirmed more recently in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
80 
in which the Court cited and quoted from 
Harriss in rejecting Citizens United’s challenge to federal campaign finance disclosure 
requirements, even as it sustained the organization’s attack on campaign spending limitations: 
“And the Court has upheld registration and disclosure requirements on lobbyists, even 
though Congress has no power to ban lobbying itself. United States v, Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 
625, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed 989 (1954) (Congress has merely provided for a modicum of 
information from those who for hire attempt to influence legislation or who collect or spend 
funds for that purpose).”81 
 
Third, the Court sent mixed signals about the constitutionality of applying disclosure 
requirements to money spent on efforts to persuade the public to communicate with legislators as 
part of efforts to pass or block legislation -- what has come to be referred to as “grassroots 
lobbying.” On the one hand, one of the charges against the Harriss defendants involved their 
failure to report grassroots expenditures. In its reference to the legislative history of the FRLA, 
the Court grouped grassroots activity with direct communications to members of the Congress 
when it explained that “at the very least, Congress sought disclosure of such direct pressures, 
exerted by the lobbyists themselves or through their hirelings or through an artificially 
stimulated letter writing campaign.”82 And in a footnote the Court quoted at length from the 
Senate and House reports accompanying the title of the bill that became the FRLA, which laid 
out the three distinct classes of so-called lobbyists who would be subject to disclosure 
requirements. The first group mentioned was 
                                                 
79
 347 U.S. at 625. 
80
 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 
81
 130 S.Ct. at 915. 
82
 Harriss, supra, 347 U.S. at 620 (emphasis supplied). 
 
 26 
 “[t]hose who do not visit the Capitol but initiate propaganda from all over the country, 
in the form of letters and telegrams, many of which have been based entirely upon 
misinformation as to facts. This class of persons and organizations will be required under 
the title, not to cease or curtail their activities in any respect, but merely to disclose the 
sources of their collections and the methods in which they are disbursed.”83  
 
On the other hand, the Court construed the Act to refer only to                                    
“‘lobbying in its commonly accepted sense’ -- to direct communications with members of 
Congress on pending or proposed federal legislation.” 84  That would appear to exclude 
communications from interest groups to the public to stimulate public communications to 
Congress. In so reading the Act, the Court quoted from and invoked Rumely, with its suggestion 
that such a narrower reading was necessary to avoid a constitutional question.  
The Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of the regulation of lobbying 
per se since Harriss. However, other cases have carried forward Harriss’s main themes that 
lobbying falls within the First Amendment’s protection of speech, press, and petition, but that 
some regulation of lobbying is constitutional and, indeed, appropriate to maintain the integrity of 
the governmental process. Lower courts have relied on Harriss in striking down state laws that 
impose excessive registration fees on lobbyists and, thus, are tantamount to a tax on political 
communication, but have also cited Harriss in upholding federal and state laws requiring 
lobbyists to register and file periodic reports concerning their finances and activities. 
Five years after Harriss, in Cammarano v. United States,
85
 the Court considered and 
rejected the claim that a Treasury regulation denying a deduction for “ordinary and necessary” 
business expenses for money spent for lobbying purposes violated the First Amendment. The 
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Court denied that the regulation discriminated against or burdened speech: “Petitioners are not 
being denied a tax deduction because they engage in constitutionally protected activities, but are 
simply being required to pay for those activities entirely out of their own pockets, as everyone 
else engaging in such activities is required to do.”86 Moreover, the regulation was justified by 
the legitimate Congressional goal of promoting a level playing field for lobbying activity: “[I]t 
appears to us to express a determination by Congress that since purchased publicity can influence 
the fate of legislation which will affect, directly or indirectly, all in the community, everyone in 
the community should stand on the same footing as regards its purchase so far as the Treasury of 
the United States is concerned.”87 
Twenty-five years after Cammarano, in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of 
Washington,
88
 the Court also upheld against a First Amendment challenge the provision of the 
Internal Revenue Code conditioning the availability of a tax deduction for contributions to 
501(c)(3) charities on the requirement that “no substantial part of the activities” of the charity “is 
carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation.” As in Cammarano, the 
Court concluded this restriction did “not infringe[] any First Amendment rights or regulate any 
First Amendment activity.” Rather, it simply reflected Congress’s decision “not to pay for” 
lobbying.
89
  
In an important concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and 
Marshall, wrote that although the First Amendment does not require a tax subsidy for lobbying, 
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conditioning the tax subsidy on a complete prohibition of lobbying by the benefitted organization 
would be unconstitutional as it would “den[y] a significant benefit to organizations choosing to 
exercise their constitutional rights.” However, because the tax code permits a 501(c)(3) charity to 
establish a 501(c)(4) affiliate -- a (c)(4) is exempt from tax on its income, but contributions to the 
(c)(4) are not tax-deductible to the donors -- which could engage in lobbying, the limitation on 
lobbying by the 501(c)(3) is constitutional. In the view of the concurring justices, the tax code 
could prevent an organization from using tax-deductible contributions for lobbying but could 
limit the use for lobbying of only the tax-deductible contributions, not other funds. For them, the 
First Amendment barred conditioning the tax benefit on a prohibition of all lobbying, including 
lobbying financed from unsubsidized donations.
90 
 
The tax cases, thus, confirm Rumely and Harriss in finding that although laws affecting 
lobbying will be viewed through the prism of the First Amendment, regulatory measures may be 
sustained where they promote traditional goals like transparency and the prevention of unfairness 
and do not unduly burden the core lobbying activity of legislative advocacy.
91
 
 
III. Lobbying and Campaign Participation 
A. Background 
A central focus of efforts to restrict the exercise of improper influence by lobbyists has 
been  to limit the ability of lobbyists to provide government officials with gifts or comparable 
material benefits such as honoraria for speeches or complementary travel, meals, or 
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entertainment. The scope of these restrictions varies considerably and states and local 
governments continue to revise and extend these rules.
92
 But elected officials may be at least as 
grateful for donations to or other forms of active support for their election campaigns as for 
tickets to the Super Bowl or golfing trips. As Professor Luneburg has observed, “lobbyist 
assistance in political fundraising is a matter of intense interest today.”93 Thomas Susman has 
pointed out that lobbyists are actively involved in electoral campaigns through “writing checks, 
hosting or attending fundraisers, delivering bundled checks, or acting as treasurer of a reelection 
committee.” As a result, “lobbyists [are] a principal source of fundraising for candidates.”94 This 
carries the potential (some would say danger) of triggering reciprocal favors by the officeholder. 
Although Dean Nicholas Allard has suggested that the role of campaign contributions in 
lobbying has been overstated, he also agrees that it would be “unrealistic to dismiss the role of 
campaign contributions on the lobbying process.” Moreover, he notes that as laws and 
regulations restrict or prohibit lobbyists from giving gifts to legislators or paying for their meals 
or entertainment, the salience of campaign contributions and other forms of campaign 
participation as a means for lobbyists to influence officials has grown: 
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“By prohibiting and restricting a wide array of activities and contacts involving lobbyists 
that are, in most cases, still permitted if related to fundraising activities, the new rules 
enhance the already too important impact of fundraising on the political process, thus 
increasing the risk of the perception, if not the reality, of impropriety. For example, under 
the [new federal] rules, a lobbyist may not buy a Congressman a meal at a restaurant 
unless he and perhaps other guests also hand over checks as campaign contributions.”95 
 
Indeed, as the New York Times recently found, the campaign finance “loophole allows 
lawmakers to reel in trips and donations” through “destination fund-raisers, where business 
interests blend with pleasure in exclusive vacation venues.”96 Public interest organizations have 
also given extensive attention to the campaign finance practices of lobbyists as donors, bundlers, 
and fundraisers. The 2011 report of the ABA’s Task Force on Federal Lobbying Laws made 
several recommendations for the “separation of lobbying and campaign participation.”97  
The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA)
98
 -- the most 
recent major revision of federal lobbying law -- addressed the campaign finance practices of 
lobbyists. HLOGA requires federal candidate campaign committees, political party committees, 
and leadership PACs to disclose the bundled contributions received from federally registered 
lobbyists that are in excess of $15,000 in a six-month period.
99
 Bundled contribution are those 
that have been collected by an individual and forwarded -- “in a bundle” -- to a political 
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committee of campaign in such a way that the person collecting and forwarding the funds is 
credited by the recipient with raising the money.
100 
 
Many states go much further than disclosure and impose substantive limitations on 
lobbyists’ campaign finance activities. Nearly a dozen states prohibit lobbyists from making - 
and legislators, state elected officials, and candidates for state office from accepting - campaign 
contributions while the legislature is in session.
101 
Another five states flatly ban contributions by 
lobbyists to some categories of elected officials or candidates for elective office, such as those 
holding or seeking offices the lobbyist has registered to lobby.
102
 Some impose a lower donation 
limit on lobbyists’ contributions to candidates or political committees than would apply to other 
donors.
103
 North Carolina not only bans lobbyists from contributing to legislators and other 
public officials but also bars lobbyists from engaging in bundling;
104
 Maryland prohibits 
regulated lobbyists from fundraising for candidates, including soliciting or transmitting 
contributions, sitting on a fundraising committee, or serving as a campaign treasurer.
105
 Other 
state laws have been more modest, requiring only that lobbyists disclose their campaign 
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contributions or their bundled contributions in their lobbying reports.
106
 Unsurprisingly, many of 
these restrictions have drawn constitutional challenges. 
B. The Evolving Case Law 
The most common state provision aimed at lobbyists’ campaign finance participation, 
and the one most frequently challenged is the ban on lobbyist contributions while the legislature 
is in session. These have drawn a mixed judicial reaction, with such bans struck down by state or 
federal district courts in Alaska,
107
 Arkansas,
108
 Florida,
109
 and Missouri.
110
 In addition, a 
federal district court in Tennessee invalidated the application of that state’s ban on lobbyist 
contributions during the legislative session to non-incumbent candidates for office, albeit without 
addressing whether the ban could constitutionally be applied to incumbents.
111
 On the other 
hand, two courts -- the Vermont Supreme Court
112
 and the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit 
113 
-- upheld session contribution bans.  
The courts invalidating the bans found them to be overinclusive in barring even small 
contributions; in applying to contributions to elected statewide officials who were not part of the 
legislative process; or in applying to contributions to nonincumbents.
114
 Some bans have also 
been found to be underinclusive because they target contributions only during the legislative 
session or shortly thereafter, thus failing “to recognize that corruption can occur anytime, even 
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outside the banned time period.”115 By taking a potentially large chunk of the year out of the 
fundraising process, the bans were said to help incumbents, as challengers would have less time 
to overcome the built-in advantages incumbents enjoy.
116
 Moreover, given the possibility of 
“unusually long” or extra legislative sessions, a session fundraising ban can be a significant 
burden on fundraising activity.
117
 
The Fourth Circuit in North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett undertook the most 
substantial treatment of the constitutional question posed by a session contribution ban. Chief 
Judge Wilkinson applied strict judicial scrutiny to the contribution restriction but still found it 
justified by the compelling state interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of 
corruption: 
“With respect to actual corruption, lobbyists are paid to effectuate particular political 
outcomes. The pressure on them mounts as legislation winds its way through the system.  
If lobbyists are free to contribute to legislators while pet projects sit before them, the 
temptation to exchange ‘dollars for political favors’ can be powerful. . . . While lobbyists 
do much to inform the legislative process, and their participation is in the main both 
constructive and honest, there remain powerful hydraulic pressures at play which can 
cause both legislators and lobbyists to cross the line. State governments need not await 
the onset of scandal before taking action. 
 
The appearance of corruption resulting from . . . lobbyist contributions during the 
legislative session can also be corrosive. Even if lobbyists have no intention of directly 
‘purchasing= favorable treatment, appearances may be otherwise. The First Amendment 
does not prevent states such as North Carolina from recognizing these dangers and taking 
reasonable steps to ensure that the appearance of corruption does not undermine public 
confidence in the integrity of representative democracy.”118  
 
Chief Judge Wilkinson also found the restriction to be narrowly tailored, as the legislative 
session typically, although not invariably, runs just a few months in an election year and is also 
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the period “during which the risk of an actual quid pro quo or the appearance of one runs 
highest.”119  
Broader bans on lobbyists’ campaign contributions have also drawn constitutional 
challenges, with similarly mixed results.
120 
In 1979, the California Supreme Court struck down a 
complete prohibition on lobbyists’ campaign contributions, adopted by voter initiative in 1974. 
The court found the ban to be fatally overbroad because it applied to donations “to any and all 
candidates even though the lobbyist may never have occasion to lobby the candidate.” The court 
also noted that by applying to small as well as large contributions the ban was not “narrowly 
directed to the aspects of political association where potential corruption might be identified.”121 
Two decades later a federal district court upheld a more tightly focused ban, adopted by 
California voters in 2001, which prohibits lobbyists from making contributions only to those 
candidates running for the offices the lobbyist has registered to lobby.
122
 The Alaska Supreme 
Court sustained a somewhat broader ban on contributions by lobbyists to candidates in 
legislative districts outside the district in which the lobbyist is eligible to vote.
123 
Both the Alaska and more recent California court decisions emphasized the dangers 
posed by lobbyists’ contributions while minimizing the burden the restrictions placed on 
lobbyists’ constitutional rights. The Alaska court found that lobbyist contributions “create special 
                                                 
119
 Id. at 716. 
120
 See generally Fair Political Practices Comm. v. Superior Court, 599 F.2d 46 (Cal. 1979); Institute of 
Government Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Comm., 164 F. Supp.2d 1183 (E.D. Cal. 2001); State v. Alaska 
Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597 (Alaska 1999); Associated Indus. of Kentucky v. Comm., 912 S.W.2d 947 (Ky. 
1995); Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189 (2nd Cir. 2010); Preston v. Leake, 660 F.3d 726 (4
th
 
Cir. 2011). 
121
 Fair Political Practices Comm. v. Super. Ct., 599 P.2d at 52, 53. 
122
 Institute of Government Advocates,, 164 F. Supp.2d at 1190. 
123
 Alaska CLU, 978 P.2d at 617-20. 
 
 35 
risks of actual or apparent corruption because of the lobbyist’s special role in the legislative 
system.”124 The lobbyist’s incentive to make contributions to large numbers of legislators who 
are “in position to introduce or thwart legislation and to vote in committees or on the floor on 
matters of professional interest to the lobbyist . . . creates a very real perception of 
interest-buying.”125 In language echoing the nineteenth and early twentieth century contingent 
fee cases, the California court emphasized that lobbyists’ contributions present a special danger 
of corruption because their “continued employment depends on their success in influencing 
legislative action.”126 These courts found that the restrictions were narrowly tailored to focus on 
the danger of undue influence without burdening lobbyists’ rights because they did not limit the 
ability of lobbyists to undertake independent expenditures, contribute to political parties, or 
volunteer on behalf of legislative campaigns.
127
 
In 2010 and 2011, two federal appeals courts divided over the constitutionality of state 
laws banning campaign contributions by lobbyists. In Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield,
128
 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit invalidated a Connecticut law 
prohibiting lobbyists and their family members from contributing to any statewide or state 
legislative candidate, a legislative caucus or leadership committee, or a party committee, and 
from soliciting contributions for such candidates or committees. The court emphasized that a 
complete ban, as opposed to a tight limit on, campaign contributions imposed a serious burden 
on First Amendment rights. Writing for the court, Judge Cabranes acknowledged the contention 
                                                 
124
 Id. at 619. 
125 
Id. 
126
 Institute of Government Advocates, 164 F.Supp.2d at 1193-94. 
127 
Id. at 1192-93; Alaska CLU, 978 P.2d at 619. 
128
 616 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 
 36 
that lobbyists receive special attention from elected officials, but denied there was anything 
improper about that: 
“Influence and access, moreover, are not sinister in nature. Some influence, such as wise 
counsel from a trusted advisor - even a lobbyist - can enhance the effectiveness of our 
representative government.”129 
 
Earlier in the same opinion, the court had upheld Connecticut’s flat prohibition on campaign 
contributions by government contractors, finding the contractor ban justified because recent 
Connecticut scandals involving corrupt dealings between contractors and government officials 
created an appearance of corruption with respect to all exchanges of money between state 
contractors and candidates for state office.
130
 But “the recent corruption scandals had nothing to 
do with lobbyists”131 so a comparable blanket ban on contributions by lobbyists could not be 
justified. The court also found that the solicitation ban was not narrowly tailored to preventing 
the kind of improper influence that might result from the bundling of contributions; however, the 
court suggested that “a less restrictive alternative” focused on large-scale bundling might pass 
constitutional muster.
132
 The following year, a different Second Circuit panel in Ognibene v. 
Parkes
133
 upheld a New York City law sharply lowering the permissible limits on contributions 
by lobbyists and persons and firms doing business with the City to candidates for municipal 
office. Ognibene relied on Green Party’s differentiation between a ban and a limit to distinguish 
the earlier case. 
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 In contrast to the Second Circuit’s Green Party decision, the Fourth Circuit in Preston v. 
Leake
134
 in 2011 upheld North Carolina’s total ban on lobbyist contributions against both a 
facial attack and an “as-applied” claim by the plaintiff lobbyist that her stated desire to make 
only $25 contributions to her favorite candidates did not raise any danger of corruption. Writing 
for the court, Judge Niemeyer reached the conclusion, directly opposed to that of Judge Cabranes 
and the Second Circuit panel, that “experience has taught” that “lobbyists are especially 
susceptible to political corruption.”  
“The role of a lobbyist is both legitimate and important to legislation and government 
decision-making, but by its very nature, it is prone to corruption and therefore especially 
susceptible to public suspicion of corruption. Any payment made by a lobbyist to a public 
official, whether a campaign contribution or simply a gift, calls into the question the 
propriety of the relationship, and therefore North Carolina could rationally adjudge that it 
should ban all payments.”135 
 
Preston emphasized the limited scope of the ban, which applied only to lobbyists’ 
contributions to candidates, and did not preclude lobbyists from canvassing for or donating time 
to a candidate.
136
 Moreover, unlike the situation in Connecticut, lobbyists had been part of the 
political corruption scandals which had led North Carolina to enact the campaign contributions 
prohibition in 2006
137
 so the “legislature thus made the rational judgment that a complete ban 
was necessary as a prophylactic to prevent not only actual corruption but also the appearance of 
corruption in future state political campaigns.”138  
Courts have also addressed a handful of other restrictions on the campaign finance 
practices of lobbyists. A federal district court in Wisconsin held that the portion of the state law 
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prohibiting lobbyists from furnishing to any agency official, legislative employee of the state, or 
any candidate for state elective office “any . . . thing of pecuniary value” was unconstitutional to 
the extent that, as interpreted by the state ethics board, the regulation prohibited lobbyists from 
volunteering personal services to political campaigns. The court recognized that Wisconsin’s 
lobby law reflects the legislature’s judgment that, as a class, lobbyists have greater potential to 
corrupt the political process than do ordinary citizens but the court found that the ethics board 
had failed to show any basis “for finding that volunteering by lobbyists threatens the integrity of 
the political process any more than volunteering by other citizens, such as environmental 
activists, insurance executives, or lawyers, whose volunteering is altogether unregulated.”139 On 
the other hand, a federal district court in Maryland upheld the provisions of that state’s law 
prohibiting a lobbyist from serving as a campaign treasurer for a candidate or elected official, 
serving on a candidate’s fundraising committee, or organizing or establishing a political 
committee for the purpose of soliciting or transmitting contributions. The court sustained these 
provisions with little discussion, noting simply that those relationships posed a danger of 
corruption and that the Maryland legislature had acted after “an actual influence peddling 
scandal” involving a lobbyist.140 
C. Regulating the Campaign Finance-Lobbying Relationship 
The increased interpenetration of lobbying law and campaign finance regulation is hardly 
surprising. Like the gifts, honoraria, and entertainment that lobbyists have long sought to provide 
to public officials, campaign financial support provides valuable private benefits that build social 
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relationships, cements good will, and may create a predisposition on the part of the elected 
beneficiaries to reciprocate by giving special access, or even taking official actions helpful, to 
their lobbyist benefactors.
141
 Given the premium elected officials place on staying in office or 
reaching for higher office, campaign finance support may be an even more successful means for 
lobbyists to ingratiate themselves with officeholders than free meals and entertainment.  
But restrictions on lobbyists’ campaign finance activities raise constitutional questions 
not posed by prohibitions on tickets to the Super Bowl or plane tickets for golfing in Scotland. 
Gifts and free meals are not forms of political speech and association, they do not help finance 
political speech, and they play no positive role in the electoral system. They are tools for 
influence peddling and nothing more. By contrast, campaign contributions, the solicitation of 
donations, and other forms of campaign participation are constitutionally protected. In the 
absence of full public funding for candidates and political parties, private campaign contributions 
are essential to the functioning of our electoral system. Candidates, political parties, and other 
political groups are dependent on donations to pay for their ability to bring facts, arguments, and 
policy ideas to the voters. Campaign contributions are also a form of political expression and 
association by donors. To be sure, campaign contributions can be limited in amount, and 
donations from certain sources may be restricted. But the constitutional protection accorded 
giving and soliciting campaign funds means that special restrictions on lobbyists’ campaign 
contributions present questions not raised by comparable restrictions on gifts, honoraria, and free 
meals and entertainment.  
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The least intrusive form of lobbying regulation, and the one most likely to pass 
constitutional muster, is disclosure. The Supreme Court has upheld disclosure requirements in 
both the campaign finance
142
 and lobbying contexts. With lobbyists already subject to 
registration and reporting requirements, it would not be a much greater burden to also require 
them to detail their campaign finance activities -- contributions over a dollar threshold, bundling 
over a dollar threshold, fundraising, or service as a campaign treasurer or fundraiser -- in their 
periodic reports. Although some of this might overlap with reports filed by candidates 
concerning contributions or staff, it would still be useful for public transparency and voter 
information to combine lobbying and campaign contribution information in a single place in a 
form which is filed electronically, downloadable, and searchable.  
Going beyond disclosure and specially restricting lobbyists’ campaign contributions, 
whether by subjecting them to tighter limits than those that apply to other donors or barring them 
from making contributions altogether, presents a more difficult question: Are lobbyists’ 
contributions particularly likely to be sources of the corruption and the appearance of corruption 
that the Supreme Court has determined is the only constitutionally permissible basis for limiting 
campaign finance activity? Some courts have been willing to defer to legislative judgments that 
contributions from lobbyists pose a special risk of improperly influencing government because of 
lobbyists’ regular and extended engagement with the legislative process, their ongoing close 
contacts with government officials, their inside knowledge, and the financial rewards they obtain 
from their relationships with officials and other government decision-makers. Other courts, 
however, have indicated that they do not see lobbyists as necessarily posing any greater dangers 
than anyone else making campaign contributions, so that tighter restrictions would require more 
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specific evidence of lobbyists’ involvement in corrupt activities. The disagreement between the 
Second and Fourth Circuits on this question brings to mind the older judicial debate over 
whether lobbying is inherently corrupting or whether there has to be some specific showing of 
misconduct before a lobbying contingency fee could be declared unenforceable. 
This issue is intertwined with the question of what ought to be considered improper or 
undue influence. In McConnell v FEC, the Supreme Court upheld restrictions on soft money 
contributions to the political parties because Congress had demonstrated that such contributions 
were given in order to win their donors preferential access, which it treated as a species of 
corruption. In language suggestive of the nineteenth and early twentieth century courts’ concern 
about the threat to self-government posed by “personal influence” and private solicitations, 
McConnell observed: 
“Our cases have firmly established that Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond 
preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing undue influence on an 
officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence. . . . Many of the deeply 
disturbing examples of such corruption cited by this Court in Buckley . . . to justify 
FECA’s contribution limits were not episodes of vote buying, but evidence that various 
corporate interests had given substantial donations to gain access to high-level 
government officials. . . . Even if that access did not secure actual influence, it certainly 
gave the appearance of such influence.”143 
 
By contrast, Citizens United was sharply critical of the use of “generic favoritism or influence 
theory” to determine what constitutes improper influence. The Court narrowed the definition of 
what constitutes corruption, declaring “ingratiation and access, in any event, are not corruption” 
and urging that the “influence over and access to elected officials” that may follow from the use 
of campaign money does not mean those officials have been corrupted.
144 
To be sure, Citizens 
                                                 
143
 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003). 
144 
130 S.Ct. at 910. 
 
 42 
United  involved spending limits,  not  contributions,  but the decision compounds the 
uncertainty as to just what must be shown about the impact of lobbyist contributions or 
fundraising to justify their special restriction. 
Arguably, special rules for lobbyist donations are misdirected or underinclusive. 
Lobbyists are advocates for the legislative or regulatory goals of clients. While lobbyists may 
have special knowledge of the state of legislative developments and special incentives to get 
contributions to strategically significant legislators at specific times in order to advance a 
particular measure, it is a client’s interest they are advancing. As such, it is not clear why 
lobbyists’ contributions present a greater risk of corruption than the contributions from the firms, 
organizations, associations or individuals they represent. Some jurisdictions have recognized that 
lobbyists, or lobbyists alone, do not present special dangers of corruption by imposing special 
restrictions more broadly. Sixteen states ban all contributions during the legislative session, not 
just those from lobbyists.
145
 Many states have adopted so-called “pay-to-play” laws limiting or 
barring donations by government contractors,
146
 or limiting or restricting donations by 
businesses in certain highly regulated fields, like gambling
147
 or the sale of alcohol.
148
 Federal 
law has long imposed a complete ban on campaign contributions by federal contractors in 
connection with federal elections.
149
 New York City may have adopted the most comprehensive 
approach, imposing very low donation limits on both lobbyists and a broad category of firms and 
individuals defined as “doing business” with the City, as well making donations from those 
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groups ineligible for public matching funds under the City’s public funding program.150 These 
restrictions were upheld by the Second Circuit in Ognibene v. Parkes. 
On the other hand, many experts with first-hand experience of the role of campaign 
contributions are convinced that there is something particularly toxic about the interaction of 
lobbying and campaign finance. If successful interest-group representation turns on building 
relationships with officials in order to get access, and lobbyists are in the business of building 
those relationships, then lobbyists – or at least the most successful lobbyists -- may be 
particularly adept at using campaign contributions to advance legislative ends. “At the very least, 
fundraisers are also an opportunity to check in, to get face time, and to build relationships.”151 
Recent political science work indicates that for contract lobbyists -- that is, lobbyists hired by a 
variety of clients, rather than in-house lobbyists who work for a specific employer -- campaign 
contributions are a significant means of sustaining relationships with legislators and a marker of 
professional success.
152
 A relatively small fraction of lobbyists account for most of lobbyists’ 
contributions.  A survey by Public Citizen found that from 1998 through 2005 only one-quarter 
of federally registered lobbyists actually made campaign contributions in excess of $200 to a 
single congressional candidate or PAC, but that 6% of all lobbyists accounted for 83% of all 
lobbyists’ campaign contributions, and that these superdonors were also major bundlers.153 
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Moreover, while it might make sense to apply the notion of special influence beyond lobbyists to 
include contractors or others doing business with government, it ought not be fatally 
underinclusive for a government to take the more limited step of focusing on the corruption and 
appearance of corruption concern posed by the campaign activity of those whose business it is to 
influence government action. 
Even if lobbyists are not necessarily a group more likely to convert campaign support 
into undue influence, recent evidence of government corruption involving lobbyists in a specific 
jurisdiction, as in North Carolina, can provide support for tighter restrictions on lobbyists in that 
jurisdiction. On the other hand, as the Connecticut example suggests, the absence of recent local 
scandals involving lobbyists may be a reason for finding that more stringent laws impose an 
unjustified burden on First Amendment rights.  
The specific restriction in question also matters. As Ognibene’s distinguishing of Green 
Party demonstrates, lower contribution limits pose less constitutional difficulty than sweeping 
contribution bans. Concerns about improper and unfair influence would also be particularly 
well-served by restrictions that focus on the nature of the relationship a campaign finance 
activity establishes between the lobbyist and the candidate, and the likelihood that the campaign 
support will be reciprocated through influence on official action. An individual campaign 
contribution -- which in most jurisdictions is subject to a dollar limit -- is unlikely to have a 
major effect on an officeholder. People active in the legislative process regularly make 
contributions not because they particularly support the candidates to whom they are donating but 
because it has become a precondition for lobbying practice. Making a campaign contribution is 
often considered a cost of doing legislative business, and it is not uncommon for a donor to give 
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to both parties and competing candidates in the same election.
154
 Such a campaign contribution 
may have a positive impact on a relationship with an elected official – as well as avoiding a 
negative implication from not having made a contribution – but the impact may not be great. On 
the other hand, direct involvement in a candidate’s campaign – such as by serving as a treasurer 
or on the finance committee -- suggests real personal support which may be more likely to be 
recognized and honored by an officeholder. Campaign activities which involve a distinct 
personal role for the lobbyist may tend to forge a link between the lobbyist and the candidate 
which subsequently gives the lobbyist extra influence. As a result, restrictions on such a 
campaign role may be justified. Bundling arguably falls between these extremes. Although 
bundling or other forms of fundraising may be less of a commitment than service as a campaign 
treasurer or other officer, bundling or fundraising over a threshold level can represent a more 
significant level of support for a candidate than merely making a personal contribution. There 
might, thus, be a good case to prohibit lobbyists from bundling for candidates running for office 
an office the lobbyist lobbies or limiting how much a lobbyist may bundle.  
IV. Substantive Regulation on Lobbying: Contingent Fees and the Revolving Door 
A. Contingent Fees
155
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General federal lobbying regulations do not restrict the use of contingent fees in the 
compensation of lobbyists,
156
 but forty-three states prohibit the practice and a forty-fourth 
restricts it.
157
 As noted in Part II, courts have long treated contingent fee arrangements for 
lobbyists as void for public policy on the theory that they create an incentive for lobbyists to use 
improper means to influence government action. Some modern court decisions continue to 
support restrictions on contingent fees. Within the last two dozen years, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court of Kentucky have rejected facial 
challenges to state laws banning the payment of contingent fees to lobbyists; a Florida state court 
found a lobbyist contingent fee arrangement to be void for public policy; and Maryland’s highest 
court permitted an enforcement action by the state ethics board to go forward against a lobbyist 
who inserted a contingent fee provision in his contract, although the court split over a procedural 
question in the case.
158 
On the other hand, in a case decided in the 1980s, the Montana Supreme 
Court concluded that a “blanket prohibition against contingent compensation of lobbyists” is 
unconstitutionally overbroad and “infringes the rights of those who, while contemplating neither 
illegal nor unethical conduct, need or desire to employ a lobbyist on a contingent fee basis in 
order to advance their interests before a public official.”159
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Modern First Amendment doctrine poses difficulties for a ban on contingent fee 
lobbying. In Meyer v. Grant
160
 the Supreme Court invalidated under the First Amendment a 
Colorado law banning payments to people who circulated the petitions used to gather signatures 
to place an initiative question on the ballot. Barring the use of paid circulators reduced the 
number of people willing to carry petitions and the number of people they could reach with their 
message, thereby making it more difficult to qualify initiatives for the ballot. The Court held that 
the restriction could not be justified by the state’s interest in assuring that an initiative has 
sufficient grass roots support to be placed on the ballot or - more pertinent to the contingent fee 
for lobbying question - its interest in protecting the integrity of the initiative process. The former 
interest was held to be adequately protected by the signature requirement itself, while the latter 
was held to be adequately addressed by laws criminalizing the forging of petition signatures, 
making false or misleading statements to obtain a signature, or paying someone to sign a 
petition.
161 
Similarly, in a series of cases involving charitable solicitations, the Court struck 
down state laws limiting the percentage of charitable donations collected that could be used to 
defray solicitation costs or pay professional fundraisers.
162
 Limiting the expenditure of funds 
used to solicit funding was treated as a limitation on the speech involved in solicitation. The 
principal justification offered by the states in these cases was the prevention of fraud, but the 
Court emphasized that the anti-fraud goal could be attained by laws targeting fraud itself or 
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requiring charities to file financial disclosure reports, so that the limits on compensation were not 
narrowly tailored to the fraud-prevention interest.  
To the extent that a prohibition on contingent fee compensation makes it more difficult 
for some individuals or groups to hire a lobbyist or reduces communications made by lobbyists 
to government officials on their behalf, a prohibition on contingent fees infringes on First 
Amendment rights. The principal justification traditionally given for the restriction is that by 
tying compensation to success contingent fees create an incentive for a lobbyist to use improper 
or corrupt means, but the comparable anti-fraud argument has not fared well in the petition 
circulation and charitable solicitation contexts, where the Court’s response has been that limits 
on compensation are overbroad and anti-fraud laws can do the job. To be sure, the Court in the 
campaign finance cases has held that Congress and the states can use campaign contribution 
restrictions to address concerns about corruption and the appearance of corruption that fall short 
of outright bribery or the payment of illegal gratuities, but contribution restrictions (and gift 
restrictions) apply directly to interactions with elected officials, whereas contingent fee 
prohibitions apply only to private contracts (although they reflect a concern about the ultimate 
impact of such fee arrangements on public actions). The contingent fees themselves, thus, do not 
literally involve the corruption of government officials. The claim, rather, is the more attenuated 
one that they create an incentive to lobbyists to take actions that improperly influence the 
officials they lobby. Still, given the extensive body of older Supreme Court case law invalidating 
lobbyist contingent fees, lower courts have been reluctant to strike down prohibitions on 
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contingent fees in the absence of a modern Supreme Court case applying the First Amendment to 
such contingency fee arrangements.
163
 
Even apart from the constitutional question, the case for regulating lobbying contingent 
fees is uncertain. Contingent fees are regularly used in the hiring of counsel and have proven to 
be a means of enabling the less affluent to obtain representation for their interests. As the ABA 
Task Force Report noted “[t]he opportunity to resort to a contingency fee contract may enable 
some private persons to obtain representation that they could not otherwise afford. . . . In this 
regard, contingency fee arrangements may promote norms of equal access to justice.”164 It is not 
clear if any empirical work has been done concerning whether contingent fees are either useful in 
obtaining lobbying representation or in fueling misconduct. 
Permitting contingency fees, but requiring disclosure
165 
of such arrangements -- as 
provided by a handful of states -- would surely pass constitutional muster. Adding such a 
requirement to existing disclosure laws would place little new burden on those required to 
register and report, and would be unlikely to curtail the availability of representation. Disclosure 
would also provide useful information concerning how widespread contingent fee arrangements 
are; how large the payments are; what types of clients use them; whether this arrangement 
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actually makes representation more available to less affluent interests and organizations; and 
whether there is any correlation between contingent fees and misconduct.  
B. Revolving Door Restrictions
166
 
As one scholar has put it, “[p]erhaps no problem in government ethics is easier to 
understand or more difficult to address effectively, than that posed by revolving-door 
employment,”167 that is, the hiring as lobbyists of former government officials upon their 
leaving public office. “Lobbying and other advocacy groups seek out former members [of 
Congress] in order to gain an advantage over the opposition.”168 “The risk is obvious that a 
client represented by a public-servant-turned-lobbyist will have, or will appear to have, an unfair 
advantage in petitioning the government.”169  
This unfair advantage can take many forms. “A former lawmaker may know about a 
Senator’s family or a House member’s parochial concerns, insights that help advocates make 
quick personal connections while pressing a policy position. They also have better prospects for 
getting a private meeting with their former Senate or House colleagues.”170 As former Solicitor 
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General and Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox put it, “the ex-official lobbyist comes 
as a friend, an insider.”171 Sometimes, the ex-official may literally have better physical access, if, 
for example, a legislature continues to give former members special access to legislative 
facilities. So, too, as Cox explained, “the ex-official will often be able to trade upon habits of 
deferring to his advice and wishes engendered during the days when he was senior to, or at least 
a more influential official than those with whom he now deals in a different capacity.” 
Sometimes the ex-official will have special knowledge or inside information about the matter 
subject to potential government action which will give her an edge over other lobbyists. Beyond 
the possibility of unfairness to other interests seeking government action, the potential for 
post-public-service employment as a lobbyist may affect the decisions of government officials 
while in office, who may be “tempted to curry favor with prospective employers or clients.”172 
As a result, Congress, many state legislatures, and a number of cities have adopted 
“revolving door” rules or “cooling off” periods limiting for a time the ability of former 
government officials to lobby the government offices where they were once employed.
173 
The 
Senate’s revolving door rule played a role in the scandal that led to the 2011 resignation of 
Senator John Ensign (R-Nev). Ensign was having an affair with the wife of his administrative 
assistant, Doug Hampton. When Hampton found out, Ensign helped Hampton establish himself 
as a lobbyist by finding him clients. Hampton then contacted Ensign’s office on behalf of those 
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clients in violation of the anti-revolving door rule, and was eventually indicted for violating the 
revolving door prohibition.
174 
The content of these restrictions vary significantly with respect to who is restricted; 
which offices, agencies, or branches of government they are restricted from lobbying; and how 
long and with respect to what matters the restriction applies. The most consistently accepted 
principles are (i) that former members of government should not be allowed to lobby with 
respect to matters with which they were personally and substantially involved as government 
employees, and (ii) that former government officers should not be able to lobby the particular 
offices or agencies where they were employed for a specific, limited period of time, typically one 
or two years. At the federal level, revolving door restrictions were initially aimed at members of 
the executive branch under the 1978 Ethics in Government Act, and the rules governing former 
executive branch officials vary considerably according to the level of the former official’s 
employment, the subject matter of his or her public service, and the nature of the representation 
in question. Congress began to regulate lobbying by former members of Congress and their staffs 
in the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, which also strengthened the limits on former members of the 
executive branch. HLOGA adopted or extended a number of revolving door restrictions so that 
former Senators are now barred from lobbying Congress for two years after leaving office and 
former members of the House of Representatives are barred from lobbying Congress for one year 
after leaving office. Higher-paid congressional staffers, including both staff to members of 
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Congress and staff to committees, leadership, and legislative offices are subject to a one-year 
restriction on lobbying the offices or committees where they had been employed.
175 
 
Revolving door restrictions have been questioned as both too restrictive and not 
restrictive enough. On the one hand, they constrain the employment opportunities of former 
government officials as well as limit the ability of private individuals and groups to retain as 
lobbyists individuals who may be uniquely well-informed about their issues and well-qualified to 
represent them. This could discourage some capable people from government service, 
particularly legislative staff members who do not enjoy civil service protections and whose jobs 
are subject to unpredictable political changes. The exclusion of former legislators and staffers 
knowledgeable about both the policy content of and legislative process for important issues is 
also a cost. On the other hand, many existing revolving door restrictions are weak. The typical 
one-year rule may not be long enough to curb unfair influence. Moreover, former members of 
Congress have demonstrated they can escape revolving door restrictions by avoiding the direct 
contacts with the legislature necessary to fall within the statutory definition of lobbying and 
instead providing “strategic consulting” services to clients. Former Senator Christopher Dodd 
demonstrated this when he became chairman and chief executive for the Motion Picture 
Association of America; -- in other words, Hollywood’s top lobbyist,-- less than three months 
after leaving office, despite the Senate’s two-year revolving door rule. As Senator Dodd 
explained, he saw his job “as an architect of legislative strategy.” “There are other people here 
who do that,” he said of direct lobbying efforts.176 
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There is relatively little case law dealing with revolving door restrictions, perhaps 
because they have generally been considered constitutionally unproblematic. An early Seventh 
Circuit decision rejected a due process challenge to the federal criminal law provision barring a 
former government official from representing a client before the government with respect to a 
matter in which the former official had been substantially involved while in government, finding 
that the “statute proscribes as precisely as possible an unethical practice that can manifest itself 
in infinite forms.”177 Similarly, an Ohio court upheld that state’s one-year revolving door rule, at 
that time aimed only at executive branch personnel, finding the “state has a substantial and 
compelling interest to restrict unethical practices of its employees and public officials not only 
for the internal integrity of the administration of government, but also for the purpose of 
maintaining public confidence in state and local government.”178 A more recent federal district 
court decision in Ohio treated revolving door laws as creating a more serious constitutional issue. 
Brinkman v. Budish
179
 enjoined the enforcement of Ohio’s revolving door law, which had been 
expanded to bar former members of the state legislature and former legislative employees from 
representing any person on any matter before the legislature or legislative committees for a 
period of one year after the conclusion of the member or employee’s legislative service. 
Brinkman involved a former legislator who was also a member of an anti-tax advocacy 
organization and sought to represent that organization, on an uncompensated basis, before the 
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legislature within the statutory one-year period. Finding that the revolving door rule burdened the 
organization’s right to retain a representative of its choosing, the court subjected the law to strict 
judicial scrutiny. The court agreed that the goals of preventing unethical practices of public 
employees and public officials, and promoting, maintaining, and bolstering the public’s 
confidence in the integrity of state government are compelling government interests, but held, 
without explanation, that they are not compelling with respect to uncompensated lobbying.
180
 A 
third interest advanced by the government -- “to prevent unequal access to the General Assembly 
by outside organizations by virtue of any significant relationships with current and former public 
officials who may be in a position to influence government policy”-- was held not to be a 
compelling interest at all.
181
 The court reasoned that Citizens United’s rejection of the idea “that 
political corruption necessarily follows from the fact that a speaker may be favored or have 
special access to elected officials” eliminates the prevention-of-unfair-access justification for 
revolving door laws.
182
 
Brinkman’s assertion that Citizens United precludes the unequal special access 
justification for revolving door laws is unpersuasive. Revolving door laws are much more tightly 
limited than the spending ban at issue on Citizens United. The “cooling off” period requirement 
targets only communications by former government officials to current government officials for 
a limited time or with respect to a limited set of matters. The former official is free to speak 
about government matters to the public, or when not seeking to influence legislative action, 
during the revolving door period and entirely free thereafter. So, too, the burden on the 
individuals and organizations that would retain ex-officials as advocates is light. They are free to 
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hire anyone other than a recent ex-official to represent them to the legislature, and to hire anyone 
they want to communicate their views to the public about matters before the legislature. The 
burden on political expression is, thus, quite modest – probably less than that posed by 
contingent fee restrictions, which may make counsel entirely unavailable to less affluent clients. 
The prevention of unequal access based on prior government service is an appropriate regulatory 
goal consistent with the longstanding purposes of lobbying laws to promote public-regarding 
government decisions and public confidence in government. Indeed, the essence of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century anti-lobbying decisions – the reliance on personal 
importunities, private solicitation, and the use of inside knowledge – is at the heart of the 
rationale for the revolving door ban, and would apply even to uncompensated lobbying. 
Despite its result, Brinkman recognizes that revolving door laws are justified by 
traditional concerns about government ethics and public confidence in government. Certainly, 
the narrower rules prohibiting representations with respect to specific matters in which the 
official was involved  are grounded in traditional conflict of interest principles barring 
representatives from switching sides in the same case. Brinkman is a useful reminder that 
lobbying restrictions generally trigger First Amendment review and that there may be a First 
Amendment outer limit to revolving door restrictions but that most revolving door restrictions 
are likely to pass muster. The court, however, erred in its unjustified extrapolation from Citizens 
United and its resulting unduly narrow definition of the public interests that can justify limited 
lobbying regulation. 
A recent development in this area has been the emergence of “reverse revolving door” 
rules limiting the hiring of lobbyists into government positions. At the start of his administration, 
President Obama issued an executive order barring – subject to waivers -- the hiring of a lobbyist 
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for a position in an agency the lobbyist had lobbied in the preceding two years and requiring any 
former lobbyist to recuse himself for two years from participating in any matters or policy areas 
in which the lobbyist had participated in the two years prior to the executive branch 
appointment.
183
 Thereafter the White House issued a memorandum directing the heads of 
executive departments and agencies not to appoint federally registered lobbyists to serve on 
advisory boards and committees.
184
   
It is difficult to see the case for a blanket ban on the reverse revolving door appointment 
of lobbyists to full-time positions. Presumably, the appointee’s prior service as a lobbyist would 
be known to both those making the appointment and to the Senate if the position requires Senate 
confirmation. If the knowledge, experience, and perspective the person brings to the position is 
attractive, it is hard to see why prior service as a lobbyist should be disqualifying per se, 
although closeness to a particular organization, industry, or special interest group might be a 
factor taken into account in the decision to appoint or confirm.
185 
If the concern is that the 
appointee would subsequently exploit the position when he or she leaves the government that 
could be addressed by the traditional revolving door rule.  
On the other hand, requiring former lobbyists to recuse themselves from specific matters 
on which they had lobbied is completely appropriate as the prospect of a conflict of interest in 
that situation is very real. So, too, restrictions on the appointment of lobbyists to part-time 
positions makes some sense as there could be a legitimate concern that a lobbyist who 
simultaneously holds high government office might have an unfair advantage in seeking to 
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influence government action. On the other hand, some advisory bodies are structured to permit 
representation of industries, organizations, or interest groups affected by the recommendations or 
decisions of those bodies. Moreover, as with the question of special limits on campaign 
contributions it is debatable whether the problem of improper special interest influence is more 
acute for lobbyists than for other individuals whose private sector positions give them a stake in 
government actions. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
noted these issues when it reversed a lower court’s dismissal of a challenge by federally 
registered lobbyists who were interested in being appointed to the Industry Trade Advisory 
Committees (“ITACs”) authorized by the Trade Act of 1974 to President Obama’s executive 
order barring registered lobbyists from serving on a wide range of advisory boards and 
commissions, including the ITACs. Emphasizing that “registered lobbyists are protected by the 
First Amendment right to petition,” the court found the plaintiffs “plausibly alleged that the ban 
pressures them to limit their constitutional right” and so “pled a viable First Amendment 
unconstitutional conditions claim.”186 As the court explained, the ITACs were created “for the 
very purpose of reflecting the viewpoints of private industry.”187 Remanding without passing 
expressly on the merits of the claim, the court noted the government’s argument that the ban was 
intended to change the “culture of special-interest access,” but observed skeptically that ITAC 
members are intended to “serve in a representative capacity,” and then directed the district court 
on remand to “ask the parties to focus on the justification for distinguishing . . . between 
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corporate employees (who may represent their employers on ITACs) and the registered lobbyists 
those same corporations retain (who may not).
188
  
V. Disclosure 
Disclosure laws generally require lobbyists to register with some oversight body and then 
submit periodic reports concerning the identities of their clients, the funds they receive and 
spend, and the subjects with respect to which they lobby.  Disclosure -- indeed, any regulation 
of lobbying – requires a definition of what constitutes the “lobbying” subject to regulation. The 
most significant unresolved issue in the definition of lobbying is whether “indirect” lobbying or 
so-called “grassroots activities” -- that is, communications aimed not directly at public officials 
but at the public in order to get people to contact lawmakers with respect to pending or proposed 
government actions – should be treated as “lobbying” subject to disclosure. Other current 
disclosure issues include whether lobbyists should be required to report more information 
concerning the specific officials they lobby and concerning the sources of the funds used to pay 
for their activities.  
A. Grassroots Lobbying 
As Dean Allard has explained, effective lobbying includes “efforts to inform and 
leverage public opinion on an issue in order to shape political outcomes. Indirect advocacy 
involves research institutions, education and public relations campaigns, mobilization and 
strategic communication efforts, and coalition building, all of which take place outside of the 
legislative chamber, but with obvious indirect effects.”189 The use of television and digital and 
social media campaigns to “build support among voters and key elites” to influence legislative 
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activity is increasingly integral to modern lobbying.
190
 Thomas Susman has pointed out that 
“[g]rassroots organizing and public relations campaigns also accompany rulemaking 
proceedings” in addition to legislative lobbying, and that with the rise of Internet organizing, 
websites, blogs, banners, and more, grassroots lobbying has become more technologically 
sophisticated and widespread.
191
 Professor William Luneburg observes that  “exhortations to 
the public at large or various sectors thereof to contact Congress or the federal bureaucracy on an 
issue or particular legislation or regulation is omnipresent today, particularly given the ease of 
Internet access to persons who may react favorably to the exhortations and, with a few mouse 
clicks and not much more effort, send the requested message or an edited version through 
cyberspace to the requested target.” In his view, lobbying disclosure that omits grassroots 
activity is “seriously incomplete assuming, as most commentators do, that it can contribute 
significantly to the success of lobbying campaigns.”192 On the other hand, some activists and 
scholars have opposed regulation of grassroots lobbying. Jay Alan Sekulow and Erik 
Zimmerman of the American Center for Law and Justice have emphasized that “[g]rassroots 
issue advocacy increases citizen participation in the democratic process by encouraging 
Americans to exercise their right to inform their elected representatives about their positions on 
important issues.” In their view, any regulation of grassroots lobbying, by imposing 
administrative requirements with the attendant costs of compliance and penalties for 
noncompliance, would significantly hamper ordinary citizens’ political activity, in violation of 
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the First Amendment.
193
 
Federal lobbying law does not apply to grassroots lobbying,
194
 but most state lobbying 
disclosure laws do cover some grassroots lobbying activity. One 2009 study concluded that all 
but thirteen states require reporting concerning some indirect lobbying expenditures.
195
 
Unsurprisingly, a number of these laws have been challenged in court, but courts have nearly 
always upheld these requirements.  
In Young Americans for Freedom, Inc. v. Gorton, the Washington Supreme Court in 1974 
rejected a challenge to the Washington State law enacted two years earlier that required 
disclosure of grassroots lobbying campaigns  involving the expenditure of more than $500 
within three months or $200 in one month “in presenting a program addressed to the public, a 
substantial portion of which is designed or calculated primarily to influence legislation.” The 
court found the requirement advanced the informational function generally justifying lobbying 
disclosure. Indeed, it concluded that striking down the law “would leave a loophole for indirect 
lobbying without allowing or providing the public with information and knowledge re the 
sponsorship of the lobbying and its financial magnitude.”196 Two years later, the Michigan 
Supreme Court in an advisory opinion that addressed a host of challenges to a proposed 
campaign finance, government ethics, and lobbying measure found it would be permissible to 
treat as lobbying subject to disclosure “soliciting others to communicate with an official in the 
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legislative branch or an official in the executive branch for the purpose of influencing legislative 
or administrative action” above the statutory dollar threshold, provided that the definition was 
“interpreted to mean express and direct requests to so communicate.”197  
The federal courts of appeals for the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, addressing challenges 
to the lobbying disclosure laws of Minnesota and Florida, respectively, rejected claims that 
regulating grassroots lobbying is unconstitutional. The Minnesota law defined lobbying to 
include “attempting to influence legislative or administrative action by communicating or urging 
others to communicate with public officials.” The National Rifle Association asserted it would 
be unconstitutional to require it to report concerning letters and mailgrams the organization sent 
to its Minnesota members urging them to contact their state legislators with respect to certain 
legislative items. The Eighth Circuit, however, rejected the claim, finding that “when persons 
engage in an extensive letter writing campaign for the purpose of influencing specific legislation, 
the State’s interest is the same whether or not those persons are members of an association.”198   
The Eleventh Circuit has twice upheld Florida’s grassroots lobbying disclosure 
requirements. In Florida League of Professional Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs,
199
 in 1996, the court 
observed that the governmental interest in disclosure of indirect lobbying efforts, including 
media campaigns may in some ways be stronger than the case for disclosure of direct lobbying 
because “when the pressures are indirect . . . they are harder to identify without the aid of 
disclosure requirements.”200 In 2008, the court rejected a challenge to Florida’s requirement that 
lobbyists report indirect communications, which the court noted might include opinion articles, 
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issue advertisements and letter writing campaigns from lobbyists on behalf of their clients to the 
press and public at large for the purpose of influencing legislation or policy. The court concluded 
that the requirement was justified by the compelling interest in voters being able to appraise “the 
integrity and performance of officeholders and candidates.”201 
The only court decision going the other way is Montana Automobile Assn. v. Greely,
202 
in 
which the Montana Supreme Court struck down the provision of Montana’s law that defined as a 
“principal” not only someone who spends more than $1000 a year to engage a lobbyist but also a 
person “other an individual” who spends above that threshold amount “to solicit, directly or 
indirectly or by an advertising campaign, the lobbying efforts of another person.” The court 
found that this could include the efforts of various organizations to ask their members to contact 
public officials with respect to legislation, and concluded there was no compelling state interest 
that would justify the burden on First Amendment rights such a provision would impose.
203 
  
The argument that applying disclosure requirements to grassroots lobbying is 
unconstitutional relies primarily on the sentence in Harriss construing the Federal Regulation of 
Lobbying Act of 1946 (“FRLA”) “to refer only to lobbying in its commonly accepted sense; to 
direct communication with members of Congress on pending or proposed federal legislation”204 
and the comparable reading of the FRLA by Rumely
205
 on which Harriss relied and quoted. But 
Harriss and Rumely are actually consistent with mandatory disclosure of at least some grassroots 
lobbying campaigns.  
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First, Harriss does not say that requiring the disclosure of grassroots activity would be 
unconstitutional, only that it could raise a more substantial constitutional question than 
disclosure with respect to direct contacts with legislators and legislative staff. Invocation of the 
constitutional avoidance canon reserves the constitutional question; it does not resolve it. 
Second, and more importantly, Harriss actually treats at least some grassroots lobbying 
as part of “lobbying in its commonly accepted sense.” The very next sentence after the one just 
quoted states: “The legislative history of the Act makes clear that, at the very least, Congress 
sought disclosure of such direct pressures, exerted by the lobbyist themselves or through their 
hirelings or through an artificially stimulated letter campaign.”206 At that point, the opinion’s 
footnote 10 cites to and quotes from the legislative history of the Act which indicates that the 
first of the “three distinct classes of so-called lobbyists” to which the FRLA was intended to 
apply consisted of “[t]hose who do not visit the Capitol but initiate propaganda from all over the 
country, in the form of letters and telegrams, many of which have been based entirely upon 
misinformation as to facts”207-- in other words, grassroots lobbying. Harriss on its own terms, 
thus, appears to permit the application of disclosure requirements to at least some grassroots 
lobbying. 
Third, the informational interest served by the regulation of direct lobbying is equally 
applicable to indirect lobbying. As Harriss found, there is an important government interest in 
enabling members of Congress to find out from those attempting to influence them “who is being 
hired, who is putting up the money, and how much.”208 With grassroots lobbying often a 
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component of efforts to influence legislative and regulatory processes, disclosure of the source 
and scope of grassroots lobbying activities can provide valuable information both to government 
officials and to the general public. Indeed, as the Eleventh Circuit observed, disclosure may be 
more valuable here than for direct lobbying because the sponsors and extent of grassroots 
lobbying efforts may be much less apparent than the interests behind face-to-face lobbying.
209
 
Finally, in the half-century since Harriss the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld 
federal campaign finance laws that require the reporting and disclosure of political expenditures 
aimed at the general public. Indeed, the Court has invoked the important public interest in 
informing voters about the interests behind electoral communications to uphold disclosure 
requirements even as it has struck down associated substantive limits on electoral expenditures. 
In Buckley v. Valeo,
210 
the Court invalidated the provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(FECA) that would have limited how much individuals or committees could spend independently 
(e.g., not in contributions to candidates, parties, or political action committees) to support or 
oppose candidates for office, but it upheld the requirement that such expenditures above a 
threshold amount be reported. More recently, in Citizens United the Court upheld the application 
of the requirements of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) for the reporting of 
independent electioneering communications above a dollar threshold to corporations even as it 
struck down all limits on corporate campaign spending. The Court reaffirmed its prior position 
that disclosure of the identity of the person, group, or organization paying for an electioneering 
communication advances the important public interest in voter information. Although campaign 
finance is not on all-fours with lobbying, the two forms of political engagement are similar and 
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have been treated by the Court as triggering similar constitutional concerns. As a result, the 
Court’s determination that disclosure of the financing of electoral communications aimed at the 
public does not violate the First Amendment would support a determination that at least some 
disclosure of grassroots lobbying would be constitutional as well.  
Nor is judicial support for disclosure limited to candidate elections. The Supreme Court 
has clearly indicated, albeit without expressly deciding, that disclosure requirements can be 
applied to organizations seeking to influence the public in ballot proposition elections.
211
 The 
courts of appeals have regularly upheld the constitutionality of state laws requiring financial 
disclosures by committees active in ballot proposition campaigns.
 212
Ballot committee 
campaigns to influence voter decisions whether to enact or defeat proposed state laws or 
constitutional amendments, closely resembles grassroots lobbying to influence legislative or 
executive branch actions. 
Applying disclosure requirements to grassroots activity raises at least two further 
questions. First, should such a requirement apply only to those whose direct lobbying activities 
have already triggered the duty to register as a lobbyist and file periodic reports, or may 
grassroots activity alone, without any direct contacts with legislative or executive branch 
officials, trigger a duty to register and report? Second, what kinds of communications aimed at 
the public should be treated as “lobbying,” as opposed to a more general discussion or advocacy 
concerning public issues?  
On the first question, limiting the disclosure requirement to lobbyists already required to 
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register because of their direct lobbying contacts with public officials is certainly less 
burdensome. Mandating the inclusion of grassroots expenditures in a quarterly or semi-annual 
report would be a merely incremental change to a pre-existing reporting requirement rather than 
the addition of an entirely new regulatory obligation. By contrast, for an individual or 
organization not engaged in lobbying in the traditional sense, imposition of a registration and 
reporting requirement for the dissemination of communications aimed at the general public or 
the organization’s members could come as a surprise and impinge on the ability to engage in 
political activity. However, from the perspective of providing government decision-makers or 
the public with information about lobbying campaigns, it does not make a difference if an 
organization engaged in grassroots activity is also involved in more traditional face-to-face 
lobbying. Limiting a registration and reporting requirement to grassroots expenditures above a 
fairly high dollar threshold, however, would mitigate the burden by focusing the obligation on 
individuals or organizations engaged in a significant level of activity.
213
 These are also the 
lobbying programs for which the public information value of disclosure is greatest.   
The second question resembles the issue central to campaign finance regulation over how 
to distinguish between electioneering communications which may be subject to disclosure 
requirements and general political speech about issues – including communications that may 
mention candidates -- that is not considered to be electioneering and therefore not subject to 
disclosure. In the lobbying context, disclosure could be limited to(i) communications that refer to 
a specific bill or a clearly identified pending or proposed executive or legislative action, or (ii)  
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messages that expressly call on listeners, viewers, or readers to contact a government official. 
The first approach has the benefit of limiting regulation to communications  addressing 
relatively determinate government actions. Much as an election is a particularly focused form of 
political activity, limiting the definition of lobbying to communications that refer to a particular 
bill or other proposed official action would also limit regulation to communications that  aim at 
a particular government decision rather than discuss public policy generally. Thus, when the 
Washington Supreme Court upheld that state’s grassroots disclosure requirement, the court noted 
that under state law “reporting would not be required when the subject campaign does not have 
as its object the support or rejection of specific legislation.”214 The difficulty with this approach, 
however, would be defining a particular legislative proposal and distinguishing it from a broader 
legislative subject, especially as particular proposals change during the legislative process. 
Would a message dealing with health insurance reform be sufficiently focused to be treated as 
lobbying, or would it have to refer to “Obamacare,” “Medicaid expansion,”  individual 
mandate, or a specific bill number to trigger an obligation to report spending?  
The second approach of limiting “lobbying” to messages that expressly call on the 
recipient to contact government officials to urge them to take a particular action provides a 
clearer standard. It is more consistent with the traditional definition of lobbying as involving 
contacts with government officials and with the Court’s express advocacy standard in campaign 
finance disclosure, which focuses on communications that call on the recipient to take the action 
of voting for or against the candidate mentioned in the message. Thus, the Michigan Supreme 
Court interpreted that state’s proposal for the disclosure of indirect lobbying to apply only to 
“express and direct requests to [others to] communicate” with officials for the purpose of 
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influencing legislative or administrative action.
215
 This approach is also more consistent with 
Rumely. As the Court explained, the activity of Rumely’s organization that attracted the attention 
of the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities was “the sale of books of a particular 
political tendentiousness.”216 There was no claim that the books called on readers to contact 
government officials. Rather, Committee Chairman Buchanan’s concern was with “attempts ‘to 
saturate the thinking of the community. ’”217 The Rumely Court was troubled by a Congressional 
investigation into efforts to influence public thinking generally rather than the legislative process 
more specifically. Such more general efforts to affect public opinion would be exempt from 
regulation under a definition of grassroots lobbying that limits coverage to messages to the 
public which use language calling on message recipients to contact government officials. 
A grassroots lobbying disclosure requirement that survives a facial constitutional attack 
could still be subject to an as-applied challenge. In upholding FECA’s campaign finance 
disclosure provision, Buckley observed there could be cases where an organization could show 
that disclosure of its activities would likely result in harassment or threats of reprisal to 
contributors or members. If so, the organization could obtain an exemption from even a valid 
disclosure law. Similar reasoning would presumably apply in the grassroots lobbying disclosure 
context, although given that such disclosure would likely be focused on organizational 
expenditures rather contributors, members, or the identities of the recipients of the organization’s 
messages, the need for an as-applied exception would not be likely to arise. 
B. Other Disclosure Issues  
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(1)Contact disclosure. Disclosure ought to require lobbyists to identify the government 
officials lobbied. For all their attention to the money spent on lobbying, relatively few disclosure 
laws require the reporting of the specific contacts a lobbyist makes with a legislator, staff 
member, or executive branch officer in the course of lobbying. Instead, disclosure laws, such as 
the federal Lobbying Disclosure Act,
218
 tend to focus on the reporting of how much was spent 
on lobbying during the reporting period and on identifying the clients. A registered federal 
lobbyist must report on the “general issue area in which the registrant engaged in lobbying 
activities, specific issues upon which a lobbyist employed by the registrant engaged in lobbying 
activities, including, to the maximum extent practicable, a list of bill numbers and references to 
specific executive branches;” and “a statement of the Houses of Congress and the Federal 
agencies contacted by lobbyists employed by the registrant on behalf of the client.”219 But the 
lobbyist need not report the specific actions requested of the officials lobbied, or identify the 
officials lobbied or even, the specific congressional committee or subcommittee, or the specific 
agency bureau, unit, or division, contacted.   
Contact disclosure would require lobbyists to disclose the specific officials, or at least the 
specific congressional offices, congressional committees, and federal agency offices, contacted 
and to provide more information about the content of that contact than the number of the bill and 
a reference to executive branch actions. If the purpose of lobbying transparency is to serve the 
public interest in understanding “the efforts of paid lobbyists to influence the public 
decision-making process,”220 contact disclosure would be at least as valuable as disclosure of the 
amount of money spent on lobbying. Indeed, only contact disclosure can actually demonstrate 
                                                 
218
 2 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. 
219 
2 U.S.C. § 1604(b)(2).  
220 
2 U.S.C. § 1601(3). 
 
 71 
the links between particular lobbyists and particular elected officials or senior agency appointees. 
When combined with the reporting of campaign contributions and other forms of financial 
assistance to the same elected officials, contact disclosure could give a fuller picture of the 
interactions between interest groups and government. The ABA Task Force Report called for a 
version of contact disclosure focused on congressional offices and committees, rather than 
specific individuals,
221
 and the Sunlight Foundation has developed a model Lobbying 
Transparency Act which would require reporting the names of the officials contacted.
222 
The city 
of San Francisco amended its Lobbying Ordinance in 2010 to require monthly reports by 
registered lobbyists that include the name of each city officer with whom the lobbyist made a 
contact during the reporting period, the date of the contact, and the “local legislative or 
administrative action that the lobbyist sought to influence, including, if any, the title and file 
number of any resolution, motion, appeal, application, petition, nomination, ordinance, 
amendment, approval, referral, permit, license, entitlement, or contract, and the outcome sought 
by the client.”223  
An alternative approach would be to require the officials lobbied to publicly report on 
their contacts with lobbyists. Professor Anita Krishnakumar proposed this in her 2007 article,
224 
and President Obama in his 2011 State of the Union Message called on Congress “to do what the 
White House has already done” and put online information about “when your elected officials 
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are meeting with lobbyists”225 -- although the proposal was rejected by Congressional leaders 
out of hand.
226 As the goal of transparency is to get a better public understanding of the interest 
group pressures on public officials, disclosure by officials of lobbyist contacts makes some 
sense. But focusing contact disclosure efforts on the lobbyists rather than the officials is likely to 
be more successful. Public officials may not always know whether the people with whom they 
are meeting are lobbyists. Indeed, in some cases, whether an individual is to be treated as a 
regulated lobbyist may vary across, or within, reporting periods depending on the extent of the 
individual’s lobbying activity. Public officials need not ordinarily maintain detailed logs of all 
their meetings. And enforcement of reporting requirements against public officials, including 
compliance with reporting time deadlines, is likely to be difficult. Registered lobbyists, by 
contrast, know who they are; likely already keep time logs in order to bill their clients; and 
already have to file periodic reports. Lobbying regulators are likely to be more vigorous in 
enforcing requirements against private lobbyists than public officials. Moreover, resistance to 
adopting contact disclosure is likely to be far greater if the disclosure has to be made by the 
lawmakers themselves instead of the lobbyists. The ABA Task Force Report recommends that 
registered lobbyists be required to report “all congressional offices, congressional committees, 
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and federal agencies and offices contacted.”227 As the Report observes, such disclosure would 
directly serve the social interest in tracing the impact of lobbying on public decision-making.
228
 
(2) Coalition lobbying.  Some significant lobbying campaigns are undertaken by trade 
associations, coalitions, or umbrella organizations that act on behalf of a collection of businesses 
or interest groups with a stake in an issue.  Traditional disclosure laws might require the 
organization formally undertaking the lobbying or hiring the lobbyist – or organized for the sole 
purpose of lobbying -- to disclose its actions, but would provide little information concerning the 
identity of the businesses, ideological groups, individuals, or other interests behind and financing 
the lobbying. The problem of obtaining adequate information about the groups actually 
responsible for lobbying is analogous to the increasingly salient campaign finance issue of 
spending by 501(c)(4) non-profit social welfare organizations and 501(c)(6) trade associations, 
which are required to disclose the fact and amount of their spending but not the identities of the 
individuals our firms supplying their funds. For both lobbying and campaign finance, the 
growing role of organizations with anodyne names that are specially created for electoral or 
legislative advocacy and do not disclose the sources of their funding or the amounts given to 
them undermines the goal of political transparency. HLOGA addresses this problem partially by  
require the disclosure of the identity of any organization that contributes more than $5000 to a 
registered lobbyist or client in a quarterly period and also actively participates in the planning, 
supervision or control of the registrant’s lobbying activities. The United States Court of Appeals 
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for the District of Columbia Circuit in National Association of Manufacturers v. Taylor
229
 
sustained this enhanced disclosure requirement in the fact of a host of First Amendment 
objections.  
Coalition lobbying may also involve grassroots campaigns. In New York, which has 
experienced extensive grassroots lobbying by coalitions of organizations intending to influence 
state budget decisions, the legislature in 2012 enacted a bill proposed by Governor Andrew 
Cuomo requiring any organization that spends at least $50,000 and three percent of its total 
expenditures on lobbying in a year to report the identity any donor that contributes at least $5000 
to the lobbying effort.
230 
One consequence of the law was that the Committee to Save New 
York, a business-backed coalition which was the highest spending lobbying group in New York 
in 2011 and 2012
231
 and spent more than $13 million to promote Governor Cuomo’s agenda, 
“went dormant as soon as the state began requiring disclosure of donors.”232 By going beyond 
the disclosure of major donors actively involved in organizational lobbying decisions and 
seeking to reach all major donors, whether involved in an organization’s lobbying efforts or not, 
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the New York law may be pushing the edge of the constitutional envelope. But the law and the 
political context in which it emerged underscore the need for enhanced disclosure of the sources 
behind coalition lobbying. 
  
VI. Conclusion 
 Although lobbying is often treated as a relatively recent phenomenon, its place in our 
representative system has been intensely debated by courts for nearly two centuries. For much of 
that time, the efforts of paid advocates to influence the legislative process were treated as tending 
to corrupt the republican form of government, yet even then many judges recognized that  
individuals, firms, and groups have legitimate interests in government action and that paid 
advocates can be appropriate intermediaries for seeking government decisions to advance those 
actions. Since the mid-twentieth century, the debate over the regulation of lobbying has been 
constitutionalized, with the Supreme Court grounding lobbying activity in the First 
Amendment’s protections of speech, association, and petition. But even then, the courts have 
recognized that the dangers of hidden and unfair improper influence justify many regulations of 
lobbying particularly disclosure. Indeed, the concerns central to the nineteenth century critique of 
lobbying – secret contacts, provision of private pecuniary benefits, misuse of personal influence, 
special access – remain salient to contemporary lobbying laws and the constitutional issues they 
implicate.  
Changes in lobbying practice raise new challenges for lobbying law. The increasing 
interpenetration of lobbying with candidate election finance on the one hand, and public relations 
campaigns on the other, have led for new calls (and some laws) that go beyond what the 
Supreme Court in the 1950s called “lobbying in its commonly accepted sense” to reach 
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lobbyists’ involvement in campaign fundraising lawmakers and “grassroots” public advocacy 
communications. These and other current lobbying law disputes – such as the Obama 
administration’s reverse revolving door rules – require consideration of whether lobbying poses a 
special danger of corruption or its appearance, what role special interests may legitimately play 
in the political process, and when is it appropriate to regulate, if only through disclosure, 
non-electoral political advocacy. The legal and regulatory balancing act of holding together First 
Amendment rights, controls on improper, and promoting government transparency may be more 
difficult than ever. 
After nearly two centuries, the debate over whether and when lobbying is a corruptive 
form of special interest influence or an appropriate – indeed, constitutionally protected -- means 
of seeking to educate and influence government decision-making remains unresolved.  It is 
likely to remain so for some time to come. 
 
